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I. INTRODUCTION 
Compulsory licensing has been a lightening rod of 
controversy in the global arena. Recent compulsory licenses 
issued by Thailand and Brazil expose very different views from 
patent-owning pharmaceutical companies versus developing 
countries and their sympathizers. For example, while one 
headline trumpets Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma 
Patents, another reads Pharmas Seven Deadly Lies about Thai 
Compulsory Licenses.1 Patent owners primarily argue that 
compulsory licenses will inevitably kill the goose that lays the 
                                                          
 1. Jon Cohen, Brazil, Thailand Override Big Pharma Patents, 316 SCIENCE 816 
(2007); Posting of Brook K. Baker, Pharmas Seven Deadly Lies About Thai Compulsory 
Licenses, to IP Disputes in Medicine (Feb. 1, 2007, 11:14 EST), http://www.cptech.org/ 
blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine/2007/02/pharmas-seven-deadly-lies-about-thai.html. There 
are, of course, also intermediate positions. For example, sometimes an article will refer to 
a compulsory license as breaking patents, while simultaneously acknowledging that 
such an action is completely legal. Jonathan Head, Thailand Takes on Drugs Giants, 
BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6587379.stm. 
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golden egg, on the assumption that patent profits are required to 
fund research and development costs. Patent owners often 
minimize discussion of whether such licenses are legal. On the 
other hand, developing countries and their sympathizers usually 
ignore innovation issues and instead emphasize the literal 
language of TRIPS, the international agreement that explicitly 
permits compulsory licenses.2 
Many seem inclined to believe that there is a single correct 
answer. Public discussions of compulsory licenses not only 
include quick dismissals of opposing views, but outright hostility 
and name calling. Patent-owning pharmaceutical companies are 
called greedy corporations that place profits above life,3 whereas 
public health advocates are decried as anti-property activists and 
patent hooligans.4 The one commonality between these positions 
is that they believe that only one view can be true. However, 
considering that there are intelligent people on both sides, 
including attorneys that should understand the law, the 
polarized positions raise a question of whether there are 
alternative phenomena at issue. 
The seeming deadlock in views suggests that there is a need 
to look for new insight to better understand and get beyond the 
deadlock. This Article does just that. This Article suggests that 
there are two competing perspectives that each provide a 
different lens through which to view whether compulsory licenses 
are consistent with TRIPS. Each lens may be consistent within 
the previously known categories of the rights-maximalist or 
rights-minimalist approach to patent law. However, unlike most 
scholarship that advocates a single approachwhether it is to 
maximize or minimize rightsthis Article suggests that neither 
is per se correct. Rather, this Article posits that the more 
important phenomenon is how a particular perspective impacts 
                                                          
 2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 3. At one point, a website critical of the pharmaceutical company Abbott 
Laboratories actions against Thailand existed at http://www.abbottsgreed.com. Although 
the website is no longer live, an archived version is available at http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20080424010611rn_2/www.abbottsgreed.com. 
 4. See, e.g., Editorial, Bangkoks Drug War Goes Global, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 7, 
2007, at 13; Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Patent Remedy, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Aug. 28, 2007, at 
13 (stating that those who endorse compulsory licenses oppose protection of property 
rights in general and IP rights in particular). In addition, a website critical of 
Thailand was created at http://www.thailies.com. Although that website is no longer 
active, an archived version is available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070909172311/ 
http://www.thailies.com. 
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how laws are interpreted and understood. Moreover, this Article 
seeks to demonstrate that recognizing the existence of these 
differing perspectives is critical because each serves as a 
powerful prism that impacts how laws, such as TRIPS, are 
interpreted and understood. Given that there is widespread 
discord not only on the appropriateness of compulsory licenses, 
but on the broader question of the appropriate balance between 
patents and public health, a better understanding of the impact 
of these competing perspectives could have significant 
implications for an improved understanding of current 
controversies and more viable solutions. 
The basic thesis is that there is a spectrum of views on 
patents benchmarked by two distinct and seemingly 
irreconcilable perspectives. One perspective of patents is that 
they are a mere privilege granted by a nation and are inherently 
subject to limitations to accommodate other societal goals, such 
as access to medicine. This view is referred to as the privilege 
view of patents. The alternative perspective views patents as a 
type of super-property right that should seldom, if ever, be 
subject to exception. This Article refers to this perspective as an 
uber-right view in contrast to the traditional conception of 
property rights that necessarily includes limitations and 
exceptions. The privilege view of patents can find some roots in 
the historical genesis of patents because patents were once a 
privilege conveyed by the crown and also often had restrictions 
on where the patented invention was used.5 On the other hand, 
the patents as a super-property view may reflect a more modern 
conception by some.6 
This Article suggests that these differing perspectives are at 
least as important as a proper interpretation of international 
                                                          
 5. See Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 16001836: How Patents 
Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 18386 (2004) 
(discussing early patents as a creature of royal prerogative because there were no 
criteria for patentability, or even scope of patent privilege); Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, 
Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the 
U.S.Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INTL L. 365, 37073 (2002) (noting that patents 
were originally designed not to protect inventors, but to protect domestic interests, such 
that early patent laws often required patents to be forfeited if they were not used in the 
granting territory); see also CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 5354 (2006) (discussing early grants of privilege 
as they relate to modern day patents). But see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas 
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical 
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 992, 1012 (2007) (challenging the traditional view that 
American patents are special legal privileges). 
 6. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 5 (2003) (suggesting that 
increasing use of the term rights with respect to intellectual property suggests that they 
must be upheld). 
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law. After all, the current controversy exists against a backdrop 
of legal rules that permit compulsory licensing.7 Some clear rules, 
such as what subject matter may be licensed, have been distorted 
to reflect a desired (uber-right) perspective of patents.8 In 
addition, both perspectives are responsible for injecting a number 
of non-issues into the discussion that serve as a smoke screen 
that blocks attention to issues in need of true resolution under 
TRIPS.9 The extent of the distortions and non-issues suggests 
that the controversies must be explained by more fundamental 
phenomena than simple rhetoric and issue-framing. Granted, 
these tools can be very powerful in shaping the creation and 
interpretation of law.10 However, the perspectives outlined here 
may reflect fundamental beliefs that precede more conscious 
rhetoric and issue-framing. 
The competing perspectives may provide an enriched 
understanding of the negotiation of TRIPS, as well as subsequent 
controversies beyond compulsory licenses. In particular, the 
competing perspectives may provide an alternative narrative for 
why developing countries agreed to TRIPS. The broad language 
under TRIPS may have permitted each side to believe that the 
agreement adequately reflected its views. Subsequent 
controversies can be viewed as instances where divergent 
perspectives are exposed. Thus far, the perspectives have been 
lurking below the surface. However, if more explicitly 
acknowledged, they could perhaps be more directly addressed in 
future conflicts when WTO panels are commissioned to resolve 
TRIPS issues. 
In addition, a better understanding of competing 
perspectives may provide an important foundation for viable 
global solutions concerning the intersection of patents and public 
health. There have been several instances thus far where 
countries have attempted to clarify the intersection of patents 
and public health under TRIPS, including when compulsory 
licenses are permissible. For example, in 2001 all WTO countries 
agreed to the Doha Public Health Declaration, which affirms the 
ability to provide compulsory licenses.11 However, the unanimity 
behind adoption of the Declaration has dissolved into divergent 
perspectives with regard to text that would otherwise seem clear, 
                                                          
 7. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. 
 8. See infra Part IV.B. 
 9. See infra Part IV.C. 
 10. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 6, at 2629. 
 11. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health Declaration]. 
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as will be later discussed.12 Similarly, although all countries 
agreed that some type of exception to TRIPS was required to 
provide access to low-cost drugs for the poorest countries, the 
solution seems to satisfy no one and also not be effective.13 
Perhaps if the competing perspectives are better understood, 
problems can be anticipated and potentially addressed in the 
proposal stage. 
While this Article aims primarily to document the 
sometimes dramatic impact of each perspective on how laws are 
interpreted, the phenomena can also be understood against the 
broader context of social cognition research. In particular, there 
is rich literature in that field that supports the idea that prior 
knowledge and beliefs may substantially impact how new 
information is processed. In particular, such literature supports 
the fact that existing schemas, such as a perspective, would be 
resistant to change even in the face of contradictory evidence. 
While this Article does not attempt to provide a thorough 
discussion of this literature, this Article will briefly address how 
the perspectives are consistent with this literature and its 
implications. After all, insights from other bodies of knowledge 
may help to reframe issues to get beyond blaming and move 
towards problem solving. 
This Article proceeds in five parts following this 
Introduction. Part II provides a brief explanation of the two 
patent perspectives that will be explored in further depth 
throughout the Article. Part III provides a case study of 
competing perspectives concerning several compulsory licenses in 
Thailand. Part IV takes a behind the scenes look at the 
differing perspectives in comparison to the rule of law under 
TRIPS. This Part begins by providing and explaining the 
relevant TRIPS provision at issue for compulsory licenses. Then, 
it documents and explains some dominant misconceptions 
                                                          
 12. See infra Part IV.BC. 
 13. See World Trade Organization, General Council Decision of 30 August 2003, 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 General Council Decision]. 
However, to date this solution has only been utilized once to provide drugs to Rwanda. 
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Rounds Public Health 
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the 
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INTL ECON. L. 921, 938 (2007). In addition, the 
company that was licensed to provide the drugs has since stated that it would be 
reluctant to do so again because of undue complexity. Press Release, Apotex, CAMR 
Federal Law Needs to Be Fixed if Life-Saving Drugs for Children Are to Be Developed 
(May 14, 2009), http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090514.asp (quoting Jack 
Kay, President of Apotex, as stating that in its current form, [CAMR is] not workable for 
us and, it appears, it doesnt work easily for developing countries). 
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concerning TRIPS, followed by non-issues that are frequently 
raised that mask legitimate TRIPS issues in need of 
interpretation. Part V first provides alternative explanations to 
the perspectives phenomena, but rebuts each one. In addition, 
Part V explains the importance of the perspectives phenomena 
for an accurate understanding of the history of TRIPS, as well as 
more recent conflicts. This Part concludes with a discussion of 
how the perspectives theories are further supported by social 
science research. Part VI concludes the Article.  
II. THE COMPETING PERSPECTIVES 
This Part posits that no single unifying view of patents is 
correct. Rather, it suggests that there is a spectrum of views on 
patents benchmarked by two very distinct and seemingly 
irreconcilable perspectives. On one end, patents are a mere 
privilege granted by a nation and are inherently subject to 
limitations to ensure that patents do not impede other socially 
desirable goals. At the other end of the spectrum, patents are 
viewed as strong property rights that should seldom, if ever, be 
encroached. This view of patent rights assumes that patents, and 
greater patent rights, will necessarily lead to greater social 
goods. The goal of this Part is not to choose a single view. Rather, 
this Part aims to show that even the most extreme views can be 
understandableat least when viewed in isolation. As explained 
in subsequent Parts, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for 
competing perspectives to co-exist in the international spectrum 
regardless of the existence of international laws. However, in this 
Part, the focus is simply to sketch the outlines of the competing 
perspectives. Parts III and IV will provide more detail through a 
close examination of differing perspectives on compulsory 
licenses. 
A. Patent as Mere PrivilegeA Moldable Tool 
On one side of the spectrum of views is the conception that 
patents are a tool inherently subject to limitations. While 
manyincluding those with an uber-right viewmay concur 
that patents are a utilitarian tool to promote innovation by 
providing an incentive or reward for new innovations, those who 
view patents as a privilege do not necessarily place innovation as 
a priority over all other social interests. Rather, promoting 
innovation is only one goal amongst other competing societal 
goals that inherently contemplate the need for balance. 
Regardless of whether patents are legally considered property 
rights, they may be viewed as a special type of property to those 
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who see patents as a privilege. As stated by Professor Baker, who 
is also associated with the Health Global Access Project,14 which 
is dedicated to eliminating barriers to access to HIV treatment: 
Patents are not property in the traditional sensethey are 
government granted rights that are intended to balance the 
interests of innovators and the public at large, and which are 
granted by governments with many express and implied 
conditions . . . .15 
The U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights supports the idea 
of patents as a privilege that must be subject to limitations in 
the public interest.16 In particular, the United Nations has 
suggested that certain human rights, such as the right to health, 
are inalienable and universal rights that must be recognized 
over state-granted rights such as patents.17 Moreover, the U.N. 
Commissioner has suggested that to the extent that there are 
actual or potential conflicts, patent rights should yield to the 
right to public health.18 
If patents were conceived as a tool to promote innovation as 
one among many societal goals, exceptions to ensure that the 
patent purpose is served would seem reasonable. In particular, 
while patents are assumed to provide an incentive to innovate, to 
the extent that patents fail to provide appropriate incentives, or 
actually interfere with additional innovation, modifications are 
necessary. Accordingly, under the view of patents as privilege, a 
nation would limit or craft exceptions to typical patent remedies 
if doing so would promote greater innovation, such as the use of 
patented inventions by researchers. 
In the area of health care and access to medicine, the idea 
that patents are a privilege has particularly dramatic 
consequences. One possible view is that the lives of patients 
                                                          
 14. The organization states that [w]e believe that the human right to life and to 
health must prevail over the pharmaceutical industrys excessive profits and expanding 
patent rights. Health GAP Global Access Project, http://www.healthgap.org/hgap/ 
about.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009). 
 15. Baker, supra note 1. 
 16. U.N. Office of High Commr for Human Rights, Sub-Commn on the Promotion 
& Prot. of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7]. 
 17. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Commn on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, 
The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on 
Human Rights, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) (suggesting that 
rights under TRIPS, which are state-granted rather than inalienable, should, where 
appropriate, bow to the more universal human rights, such as the right to health); accord 
Resolution 2000/7, supra note 16, ¶ 3 (reminding all Governments of the primacy of 
human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements). 
 18. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 16, pmbl., ¶ 3. 
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have to come before the patents of drug companies,19 such that 
substantial modifications of patents are appropriate, particularly 
if a nation places a premium on the right to health through 
programs such as universal access to essential drugs, including 
HIV treatment for all citizens. Accordingly, possible limitations 
on a patent right to accommodate public health interests might 
include limits on the scope of patentability, shorter patent terms, 
and compulsory licenses. 
The view of patents as a privileged tool does not necessarily 
advocate abolishing all patents. However, considering patents 
and the scope of their rights as a privilege injects more hesitation 
into whether they should be granted in the first place. For 
example, countries such as India and China could be seen as 
embracing a view of patents as a privilege in their national 
approaches to patents prior to TRIPS because they provided 
patents on methods of making drugs, but not on drugs 
themselves.20 The rationale of providing a patent incentive to 
increase new methods of creating drugs, but not monopoly rights 
on needed drugs, seems to fit with a view of patents as a tool to 
promote progress in advancing other social interests, such as 
broad access to low-cost drugs. Another example of a nation 
viewing patents as privilege would be Canada. Until a trade 
agreement with the United States required Canada to change its 
laws,21 Canada broadly granted compulsory licenses on drugs to 
increase access to medicine.22 
The view of patents as a privilege is also consistent with the 
historical requirement of many nations to require a patent owner 
to work the patent locally. Although there is currently some 
question as to whether such a requirement would be consistent 
                                                          
 19. Press Release, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, MSF Welcomes Move 
to Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thailand (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.msfaccess.org/ 
media-room/press-releases/press-release-detail/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=20&cHash=f8040f62f5 
(quoting Dr. David Wilson of Médecins Sans Frontières). 
 20. See Ying Zhan, Patent Protection for Biotechnology in China: The Current 
Legislation and the Proposed Third Amendment, 5 J. INTL BIOTECH. L. 34, 34 (2008); 
Xiaolu Wei, Drugs and Intellectual Property Rights, LAW@MIT, Fall 2006, at 2, 
http://web.mit.edu/lawclub/www/lawjournal.html; infra text accompanying note 202 
(providing an explanation for Indias prior approach to patents). 
 21. See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 104, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 22. However, although more constrained by international rules, Canada can still be 
seen to take a privilege approach to its patent laws. For example, until a recent challenge 
within the WTO, Canada allowed generic manufacturers of drugs to make and stockpile 
drugs during the patent term to enable true competition with the patent ownerand 
lower costson the very day of patent expiry. Panel Report, CanadaPatent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 4.14, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000). 
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with TRIPS,23 a number of countries have historically limitedor 
entirely eliminatedpatent rights if a patent owner failed to use 
the patent in the nation that granted it. The requirement to 
make the product locally was intended to help transfer the 
technology to local citizens.24 The sanction for failure to work has 
included total forfeiture of a patent or compulsory licensing, as a 
less onerous punishment than complete patent forfeiture.25 
The privilege view would take a cautious approach towards 
requiring patent rights globally. Because patents are seen as a 
tool to promote innovation, and because there is literature to 
support that patents alone are not adequate to support such 
innovation, increasing patents globally would not be 
encouraged.26 Rather, those who believe that patents are a 
privilege would advocate allowing each nation to decide when 
and whether to grant patents and how to define their scope. 
Accordingly, those who view patents as a privilege would be 
opposed to an international agreement that mandates patents. 
However, to the extent that an international agreement was 
required, those who view patents as a privilege would likely be 
more amenable to an agreement that permitted national 
discretion to recognize competing interests. Indeed, some of the 
language in TRIPS can be seen as the handiwork of those who 
                                                          
 23. The United States challenged Brazils local working requirement. Request for 
the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, BrazilMeasures Affecting Patent 
Protection, WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001); Request for Consultations by the United States, 
BrazilMeasures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). However, the 
parties came to a mutually agreed settlement, such that there has been no official WTO 
analysis of whether local working is required or barred under TRIPS. Notification of 
Mutually Agreed Solution, BrazilMeasures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199/4 
(July 19, 2001); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY 
AND ANALYSIS 35961 (3d ed. 2008). In addition, the negotiation history of TRIPS reveals 
a huge divide in viewpoints that do not seem to have ever been reconciled. See, e.g., 
Champ & Attaran, supra note 5, at 37380 (discussing conflict between the United States, 
the EU, and developing countries regarding local working of patents). 
 24. Champ & Attaran, supra note 5, at 37071. 
 25. Compare Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar. 
20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372 (The patentee . . . shall be subject to the obligation of working his 
patent conformably to the laws of the country into which he has introduced the patented 
articles.), with Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, Mar. 20, 
1883, as revised at The Hague Nov. 6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789 (permitting revocation for 
failure to use only if the granting of compulsory licenses shall not suffice to prevent such 
abuses); see also, e.g., Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working 
Requirements and Compulsory Licensing at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
243, 26667, 285 (1997). 
 26. E.g., COMMN ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 7989 (3d ed. 2003) (suggesting that 
increased patent rights may not be optimal for developing countries); Carlos M. Correa & 
Sisule F. Musungu, The WIPO Patent Agenda: The Risks for Developing Countries 23 
(Trade-Related Agenda, Dev. & Equity, Working Paper No. 12, 2002). 
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view patents as a privilege: Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS talk about 
balancing patent rights, and Article 30 explicitly considers the 
rights of third parties in limiting the rights of the patent holder.27 
B. Patents as an Uber-right 
The alternative perspective views patents not as a privilege, 
but rather, as a privileged property right, or an uber-right that is 
stronger than other property rights. All rights have exceptions, 
including property rights.28 Nonetheless, those who subscribe to 
the uber-right view likely see any possible limitation on patent 
rights as extremely suspect. While they recognize that property 
rights may be limited, they nonetheless analogize legal 
exceptions such as compulsory licensing to stealing. They suggest 
that limits on patents should be exercised with caution because 
the nature of the patent right is based entirely in the right to 
exclude. 
Those who see patents as an uber-right believe that patents 
deserve an exalted status because they provide the necessary 
reward to fuel innovation that benefits all of society. The high 
costs of patented drugs are acknowledged, but most often in the 
context of emphasizing the high costs and long path towards 
drug discovery.29 To the extent that high costs of patented drugs 
may impede access, proponents of uber-patent rights suggest 
that the problem is one of poverty, such that any possible 
solution lies outside patent law.30 
Although they recognize that access is limited during the 
patent term by prices set by patent owners, they suggest that 
patents benefit all. For example, Fred Hassan, Chairman and 
CEO of major pharmaceutical company Schering-Plough, 
                                                          
 27. TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 78, 30. 
 28. For example, the traditional property right may be limited by the nuisance 
doctrine, as well as by takings. 
 29. See Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: 
Maximizing Access to Essential Medicines While Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 37 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 216 (2009) (suggesting that consumers in developing countries 
do not understand that the high cost of drugs reflects the less visible, but nonetheless 
high costs of research and development in a broader discussion against use of compulsory 
licensing). 
 30. See Richard P. Rozek, The Effects of Compulsory Licensing on Innovation and 
Access to Health Care, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 889, 89697 (2000) (pointing to other 
barriers to access). In addition, uber-right sympathizers are inclined to suggest that 
problems related to the exclusivity of patent rights may pale in comparison to other 
factors that increase the cost of medicine, such as tariffs and taxes that some countries 
impose on imported drugs. E.g., Roger Bate, Death and Taxes: Why Taxes and Tariffs on 
Medicines in Developing Nations Is a Fatal Policy, MED. PROGRESS TODAY, May 5, 2005, 
http://www.medicalprogresstoday.com/spotlight/spotlight_indarchive.php?id=752. 
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suggests that patent protection is actually responsible for low 
cost generics: 
   IP protection for pharmaceutical innovation creates a 
wonderful cycle. It rewards and incentivizes the huge 
investments needed to create new medicines. Then, on 
expiration of the patent, the innovation becomes freely 
available to all. Generic drugs are thus the direct result of 
IP-fueled innovation. They would not exist without IP. And 
without IP, we would not see new advances in medicines 
that in turn would become generic drugs.31 
Similarly, Professor Martin Adelman has suggested that the 
question of access to medicine often overlooks the simple fact 
that without patents there would be far fewer drugs around for 
people to access. One cannot have access to something that does 
not exist.32 
The uber-right perspective has invoked human rights norms 
to support their position. In particular, they argue that inventors 
have a right to benefit from the fruits of their invention based 
upon language in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).33 While neither document refers 
explicitly to either patents or intellectual property rights, both 
include a clause about how everyone should enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and benefit from protection of interests from 
any scientific production of which he is the author.34 The basic 
argument is that if patent rights are minimized, the author 
(inventor) is deprived of the protection of his interests.35 
                                                          
 31. Fred Hassan, Chairman & CEO, Schering-Plough Corp., Keynote Address at 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 5th Annual Intellectual Property Summit, Fueling 
Innovation: To Be Our Best for a Better World (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.phrma.org/ 
about_phrma/ceo_voices/fueling_innovation_to_be_our_best_for_a_better_world. This 
quote also illustrates a false dichotomythe choice presented is patents versus no 
patents, without considering the possibility of promoting innovation while simultaneously 
providing access to cheaper generic medication. 
 32. Martin J. Adelman, Compulsory Licensing of Drugs: TRIPS Context 1, Paper 
Presented at ATRIP Annual Meeting in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.atrip.org/upload/files/activities/tokyo2003/s02-Adelman_art.doc. 
 33. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, art. 
27(2), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR] (Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
art. 15(1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 34. UDHR, supra note 33, art. 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 15(1). 
 35. However, the same article has been read to support the perception of patents as 
privilegethat consumers are entitled to enjoy the results of scientific progress in drug 
discovery, such that they have actual access to medicine, and not merely theoretical 
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If patents are uber-rights, they should be given more 
protection than other rights. For example, although injunctions 
are equitable remedies that typically require a court to consider 
and balance a variety of factors including harm to the plaintiff, 
the defendant, and the public interest, an uber-right perspective 
may take a more extreme approach. In particular, the uber-right 
view would hold that if a patent is found to be infringed, a 
permanent injunction should be nearly automatic.36 
The uber-right perspective would want to limit any and all 
exceptions to patent rights. Compulsory licenses would be 
considered anathema to an uber-right perspective and only 
permissible in the narrowest of circumstances.37 In particular, a 
compulsory license would likely be considered valid only if the 
patent owner was incapable of providing an adequate supply.38 
Extending the global reach of patents would also be 
consistent with patents as an uber-right. In particular, some of 
the arguments made in support of mandatory international 
minimum rights for patents reflect this perspective. Prior to the 
conclusion of TRIPSthe first international agreement setting 
forth minimum patent rightssome suggested the need for 
strong patent laws to promote innovation and prosperity.39 In 
addition, they argued that strong patent systems would improve 
the economic status of nations by promoting foreign direct 
investment.40 
                                                          
access based upon economic conditions beyond their control. 
 36. This view has been espoused for years by the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., W.L. 
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988); H.H. 
Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (In matters 
involving patent rights, irreparable harm has been presumed when a clear showing has 
been made of patent validity and infringement. (citing Smith Intl, Inc. v. Hughes Tool 
Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). This presumption derives in part from the 
finite term of the patent grant. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that this view 
is an incorrect reading of the law, at least with respect to copyright infringement. eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 39293 (2006). Even so, that may not 
necessarily change existing perspectives. 
 37. See, e.g., Rozek, supra note 30, at 890, 904. 
 38. See e.g., Adelman, supra note 32, at 2. 
 39. E.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 91 (2007) (noting that proponents of 
TRIPS emphasized the importance of promoting intellectual property rights to incentivize 
innovation); Negotiating Group of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of 25 March 1987, ¶ 4, MTN.GNG/NG11/1 
(Apr. 10, 1987) (noting that greater protection of intellectual property rights was 
necessary to provide incentives to innovate). 
 40. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: 
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. 
TRANSNATL L. 689, 698 n.16 (explaining the argument that increased intellectual 
property protection may increase economic development, while simultaneously critiquing 
its lack of empirical basis). But see Michelle McGrath, The Patent Provisions in TRIPS: 
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Proponents of the uber-right perspective would argue for 
strong international patent norms with minimal exceptions. They 
would want to minimize as much as possible exceptions such as 
compulsory licenses. Moreover, to the extent that prevailing 
global norms seem to permit too many exceptions, those who 
believe in uber-rights would want to change the norms, such as 
by negotiating free trade agreements that create stronger patent 
rights with narrower exceptions. 
Those who believe in patents as an uber-right tend to not see 
a conflict between strong patent rights and competing interests, 
such as public health. The view is that because patent rights 
necessarily promote innovation, possible long-term benefits 
trump any current access problems. Moreover, the strong belief 
in the value of patent rights is maintained in the face of evidence 
that patent rights do not compel innovation in all areas; for 
example, it is widely documented that patent rights do not 
promote research into so-called neglected diseases that 
primarily afflict poor countries that cannot afford to pay a patent 
premium.41 Nonetheless, when there are discussions of limiting 
patent rights, those who believe in patents as an uber-right 
suggest that any limitations will sacrifice research into these 
neglected diseases. For example, in response to Brazils 
compulsory license of the HIV medication efavirenz, the major 
pharmaceutical company Merck stated that [t]his expropriation 
of intellectual property sends a chilling signal to research-based 
companies about the attractiveness of undertaking risky research 
on diseases that affect the developing world, potentially hurting 
patients who may require new and innovative life-saving 
therapies.42 
III. A CASE STUDY IN COMPETING PERSPECTIVES: 
THAILANDS COMPULSORY LICENSES 
This Part illustrates competing perspectives of patents 
through the lens of recent conflicts concerning compulsory 
                                                          
Protecting Reasonable Remuneration for Services RenderedOr the Latest Development in 
Western Colonialism?, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REP. 398, 400 (1996) (asserting that 
experience disproves the alleged connection between strict IP protection and foreign 
investment). 
 41. COMMN ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 13 
(2006) (noting how diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries receive 
essentially no commercially based R&D in the rich countries). 
 42. Press Release, Merck & Co., Statement on Brazilian Governments Decision to 
Issue Compulsory License for STOCRIN (May 4, 2007), http://www.merck.com/ 
newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2007_0504.html. 
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licenses issued by Thailand. This Part begins with a 
chronological background to Thailands actions. This Part then 
presents separate vignettes to present the story of Thailand 
versus PhRMA. The vignettes were not created by either party, 
but should represent their beliefs because the information is 
distilled from a ninety-page white paper issued by Thailand, as 
well as numerous news articles and corporate press releases.43 
A. Background 
Since 2002, Thailand, a lower middle-income country, has 
offered its citizens universal access to medicine and has provided 
access to antiretrovirals (ARVs) for patients with HIV since 
2003.44 International agencies, including the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the World Bank, have recognized 
Thailands success in providing treatment for those infected with 
HIV.45 Thai HIV patients are similar to HIV patients globally; 
they eventually need newer treatments as they build resistance 
                                                          
 43. See THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & NATL HEALTH SEC. OFFICE, FACTS AND 
EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS 
ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND (Vichai Chokevivat ed., 2007), 
available at http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20Paper%20CL-EN.pdf [hereinafter 
WHITE PAPER]; THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH & NATL HEALTH SEC. OFFICE, THE 10 
BURNING QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THE FOUR ANTI-
CANCER DRUGS IN THAILAND (2008), available at http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20 
paper%20CL%20II%20FEB%2008-ENG.pdf [hereinafter TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON 
CANCER DRUGS]; see also Roger Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, HEALTH POLY 
OUTLOOK, Apr. 2007, at 6, http://www.aei.org/outlook/25890 [hereinafter Bate, Thailand 
and the Drug Patent Wars] (discussing history of Thailand compulsory licensing and 
implications for Thai people and government); Roger Bate, Op-Ed., Thai-ing Pharma 
Down, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Feb. 9, 2007, at 13 [hereinafter Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down] 
(discussing effects of 2007 compulsory licensing for Thailand); Juliano Froehner, 
Compulsory Licensing: Inevitable Failures of the Thailand Strategy in the Global Fight 
Against HIV/AIDS (July 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author). 
 44. National Health Security Act, B.E. 2545 § 5 (2002) (Thail.); see also Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 § 51 (2007), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote 
eds., 2008) (A person shall enjoy an equal right to receive standard public health 
service . . . .). 
 45. WHO & THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE HEALTH 
SECTOR RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS IN THAILAND 35 (2005), available at 
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/News_and_Events_ThailandProgrammeReviewNEW.
pdf [hereinafter EXTERNAL REVIEW] (noting Thailands achievement of national treatment 
target from 2001 to 2004 of treating more than 50% of those in need of antiretroviral 
treatment); ANA REVENGA ET AL., WORLD BANK, THE ECONOMICS OF EFFECTIVE AIDS 
TREATMENT: EVALUATING POLICY OPTIONS FOR THAILAND 38 (2006) (reporting success 
from 2002 to 2004 in increasing health care coverage and use while reducing household 
out-of-pocket expenditures). Similarly, Doctors Without Borders described Thailand as 
having one of the gold standard treatment programmes for the developing world. Amy 
Kazmin & Andrew Jack, Thailand Breaks Patent for AIDS Drug to Cut Costs, FIN. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2006, at 9 (quoting Nathan Ford of Doctors Without Borders). 
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to older drugs. However, newer treatments tend to be patented 
and much more expensive.46 
A looming budget problem for Thailands continued 
treatment of its HIV patients had previously been forecast, with 
the idea of compulsory licensing explicitly mentioned as a 
possible mechanism to provide cost-effective treatment by the 
World Bank. At the same time, the World Bank noted that such 
an approach would require high-level political resolve.47 
Thailand issued compulsory licenses to achieve its mandate 
of providing access to essential drugs after years of negotiation 
with patent owners failed to yield price cuts beyond the level of 
currency appreciation. The licenses were issued to cover only 
Thai citizens who are supported by government-funded insurance 
and not the small percent of Thai citizens who are capable of 
paying the premium patent prices for the drugs.48 Wealthy Thai 
citizens would be required to purchase their own drugs at the 
price set by patent owners.49 
Thailand issued three compulsory licenses over a period of 
several months. Two were for patented drugs used in the 
treatment of HIV and the third was for a heart disease 
medication.50 
                                                          
 46. First-line treatments are available cheaply as generic drugs, primarily from 
India, which before 2005 did not provide patents on drug compounds. See, e.g., MÉDECINS 
SANS FRONTIÈRES, WILL THE LIFELINE OF AFFORDABLE MEDICINES FOR POOR COUNTRIES 
BE CUT? CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICINES PATENTING IN INDIA 23 (2005), 
http://msf.fr/drive/2005-02-01-msf.pdf. 
 47. See REVENGA ET AL., supra note 45, at 16970. 
 48. WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 6. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The first license was issued on November 29, 2006, for Mercks patented drug 
efavirenz (sold by Merck under the brand name Stocrin). DEPT OF DISEASE CONTROL, 
THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT UNDER DRUGS AND 
PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT (2006), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, 
at 38, 3940 [hereinafter EFAVIRENZ LICENSE]. Efavirenz is an effective first-line 
treatment for HIV that has fewer adverse side effects than generic HIV drugs. Id. at 39. 
Most developed countries treat all new patients with efavirenz. WHITE PAPER, supra note 
43, at 13. The second licensed antiretroviral was issued on January 24, 2007, for Abbotts 
patented combination drug lopinavir and ritonavir, sold under the brand name Kaletra, 
which is commonly used to treat HIV patients that build resistance to older drugs. DEPT 
OF DISEASE CONTROL, THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT UNDER 
DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR COMBINED FORMULATION OF 
LOPINAVIR AND RITONAVIR (2007), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 41, 4243 
[hereinafter KALETRA LICENSE]. Abbott sold Kaletra in Thailand at a price of $2,200 per 
patient per yeara cost that exceeds the $1,600 yearly income of the average Thai citizen. 
Paul Cawthorne et al., Access to Drugs: The Case of Abbott in Thailand, 7 LANCET: 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 373, 37374 (2007). The third license was issued on January 25, 
2007, for Sanofi-Aventiss heart disease drug Plavix, which the license notes is relevant to 
treating one of the top three causes of death in Thailand; without the license, only 20% of 
government-insured patients could access the drug, which is inconsistent with the 
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In February 2007, Thailand issued a ninety-page white 
paper, entitled Facts and Evidences on the 10 Burning Issues 
Related to the Government Use of Patents on Three Patented 
Essential Drugs in Thailand, including supporting documents to 
defend its three compulsory licenses. Although the white paper 
was meant to support Thailands position, some statements likely 
induced additional concern. In particular, the document 
telegraphed Thailands intent to consider issuing additional 
licenses on up to 15% of patented drugs and that it would 
consider a license warranted when the market price was 
considered too high to achieve Thailands goal of universal access 
to essential drugs.51 
Companies and countries began to react. Switzerland, home 
to patent owner Novartis, published an Aide Mémoire in late 
February 2008 in which it acknowledged that TRIPS provides for 
compulsory licenses, but emphasized that they should be used 
only as a last resort given that [p]atents are of paramount 
importance for the research and development of new 
pharmaceuticals.52 Abbott responded to the compulsory license of 
its drug by withdrawing several drugs from the Thai marketplace 
in March 2007, including a heat-stable form of Kaletra, 
particularly well suited for the Thai climate.53 The U.S. Trade 
                                                          
universal coverage of essential medicines. THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING 
OF RIGHT UNDER DRUGS AND PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR CLOPIDOGREL 
(2007), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 44, 4446 [hereinafter PLAVIX 
LICENSE]. 
 51. WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 12. The criteria for issuing a compulsory license 
includes a listing on the National Essential Drug List; a need to solve public health 
problems, emergencies, or epidemics; or a need to save lives where the price of the drug is 
too high to be affordable by the government. Id. at 11. Thailand attempted to stem 
concern by noting that lifestyle drugs, such as those to treat baldness, acne, or erectile 
dysfunction would not be considered for compulsory licenses. Id. at 12; see also Sinfah 
Tunsarawuth, 20 More Drugs in Pipeline for Possible Compulsory Licenses, INTELL. PROP. 
WATCH, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=806 (noting that 
Thailand would probably only issue ten licenses out of twenty considered). 
 52. Aide Mémoire: Compulsory Licences in Thailand on Pharmaceuticals Under 
Patent Protection (Feb. 25, 2008) (on file with Houston Law Review), available at 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/1/swiss2thailand_cl.pdf. 
 53. Erika Check, Abbotts AIDS Fight-back, NATURE, July 5, 2007, at 14; see also 
Editorial, Putting Meaning Back into TRIPS, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.aegis.org/news/bp/2007/BP070308.html (arguing compulsory licensing is an 
exercise of Thai citizens rights under TRIPS); Nicholas Zamiska, Abbott Escalates Thai 
Patent Rift, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A9 (reporting Abbott withdrew a new version of 
Kaletra that would be more convenient to take). In addition, patent owner Sanofi-Aventis 
has threatened legal action against the Indian drug company Cadila that was to supply 
low-cost versions of Plavix to Thailand. Rupali Mukherjee, Pharma Firms Under US 
Pressure to Stop Generic Sale, TIMES INDIA, Feb. 13, 2008, available at 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2777692.cms; C.H. Unnikrishnan, Sanofi 
in Talks with Thai Govt to Protect Its Patent Right, LIVEMINT.COM, Mar. 13, 2008, 
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Representative (USTR) elevated Thailand to Priority Watch 
status on its Special 301 list, which may lead to unilateral trade 
sanctions, as well as pressure to agree to a regional trade 
agreement that increases patent protection.54 
Thailand continued to explore additional compulsory 
licenses amidst the criticism. In June 2007, Thailand established 
two exploratory committees to consider possible compulsory 
licenses on cancer medications.55 At the same time, Thailand was 
pressured against perceived broad use of compulsory licenses by 
EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, as well as by the U.S. 
Ambassador to Thailand, Ralph Boyce.56 
After initially promising negotiations stalled,57 Thailand 
issued licenses on four cancer drugs in January 2008 on the eve 
of a change in government administration.58 Thailand asserted 
                                                          
http://www.livemint.com/2008/03/13164842/Sanofi-in-talks-with-Thai-govt.html. 
 54. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 27 
(2007); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 
3637 (2008) (maintaining Thailands status on the Priority Watch List because of 
concerns of inadequate and ineffective protection of patent medicines along with concerns 
over piracy and counterfeiting). 
 55.  Posting of Ed Silverman, Thailand May Break Patents on Cancer Meds, to 
Pharmalot (June 22, 2007, 7:22 EST), http://pharmalot.com/2007/06/thailand-may-break-
patents-on-cancer-meds. 
 56. Letter from Peter Mandelson, Eur. Union Trade Commr, to Krirk-krai Jirapaet, 
Thai Minister of Commerce (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/ 
pijip_static/documents/mandelson07102007.pdf (noting concern about Thailands use of 
compulsory licenses and asserting that [n]either the TRIPS Agreement nor the Doha 
Declaration appear to justify a systematic policy of applying compulsory licences wherever 
medicines exceed certain prices); Letter from Ralph L. Boyce, U.S. Ambassador to 
Thailand, to Surayud Chulanont, Thai Prime Minister (July 20, 2007), available at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-August/011610.html (noting concern 
about potential issuance of additional compulsory licenses). 
 57. Thailand began negotiations for lower prices on patented cancer drugs in 
October 2007, but these negotiations eventually broke down in December 2007. TEN 
BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 34. 
 58. On January 4, 2008, licenses were issued on Docetaxel, the breast and lung 
cancer drug by Sanofi-Aventis; Erlotinib, a drug for treating lung, pancreatic, and ovarian 
cancer by Roche; Imatinib, a cancer drug patented and sold by Novartis as Glivec; and 
Letrozole, a breast cancer medicine made by Novartis AG. THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. 
HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT ON PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR DOCETAXEL 
(2008), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 22, 
2223 [hereinafter DOCETAXEL LICENSE]; THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF 
RIGHT ON PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR ERLOTINIB (2008), reprinted in TEN 
BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 26, 2627; THAI MINISTRY OF 
PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT ON PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR 
LETROZOLE (2008), reprinted in TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 
43, at 24, 2425; THAI MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, EXERCISING OF RIGHT UNDER DRUGS 
AND PHARMACEUTICALS PRODUCTS PATENT FOR IMATINIB (2008), reprinted in TEN 
BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 28, 2829; see also Sinfah 
Tunsarawuth, New Thai Minister May Review Compulsory Licences on Cancer Drugs, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2008/02/08/new-thai-
minister-may-review-compulsory-licences-on-cancer-drugs (reporting that Thailands new 
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that they were necessary because cancer is currently the number 
one cause of death in Thailand, and most effective cancer 
treatments are patented and thus inaccessible to most citizens 
because of undue expense.59 
On February 7, 2008, the first day of taking office, the new 
Thai Public Health Minister announced that he would reevaluate 
the decision to issue licenses on the cancer drugs.60 Ultimately, 
Thailand decided not to revoke any of the compulsory licenses 
despite being told that the continued imposition of licenses 
threatened to impact Thailands international trade.61 Some 
suggested that canceling the licenses would be inconsistent with 
the Thai constitution and other laws requiring the government to 
provide low-cost drugs. Thailand has also resisted the suggestion 
that it promise to forgo the option of compulsory licenses in the 
future, arguing that to do so would be a neglect of duty or failure 
to exercise the rights established by the law to safeguard public 
interest and public health.62 
B. Thailands (Patent as Privilege) Perspective 
Thailand is committed to the health of it citizens, even if 
such commitment requires taking bold steps in the international 
arena and potentially prompting the ire of more powerful 
countries.63 Thailand is required to provide all Thais with access 
to essential medicines, including drugs to treat HIV.64 Thailands 
                                                          
Public Health Minister may review compulsory licenses issued by previous government). 
 59.  Letter from Sanguan Nitayarumphong, Chair of the Subcomm. on Selecting the 
Essential Drugs with Access Problems Under the Natl Health Ins. Schemes, to Mongkol 
Na Songkhla, Minister of Pub. Health (Sept. 25, 2007), reprinted in TEN BURNING 
QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 15, 17. 
 60. Editorial, Bangkoks Drug War, Round Two, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Feb. 27, 2008, at 
13. 
 61. Nopporn Wong-Anan, Thailand Will Override Cancer Drug Patents, REUTERS, 
Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSBKK14764720080310. 
 62. TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 1112. 
 63. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 4 (stating that compulsory licenses for 
essential drugs are clear evidence of the governments commitment to put the right to life 
above the trade interest). Specifically regarding the economic impact of potential 
international sanctions, the Thai Ministry of Public Health has noted the following: 
[A]t least two-thirds of our economy depends on exporting of our goods and 
services. . . . If the US government applies retaliation measures on our exports 
which results in 10 percent reduction of exports to the US market, it will mean a 
one to 1.2 per cent loss of economy and several hundred thousands job losses. So 
this is a very sensitive issue. Unless there is very important need for the people 
supported by solid evidences, we will not make these decisions. 
Id. at 16. 
 64. Since 2002, Thailand has had a mandate to achieve universal access to essential 
medicines for all its citizens, with access to ARVs included since 2003. Id. at 12. 
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commitment to health care has been recognized by international 
agencies such as the World Bank and the World Health 
Organization.65 Thailand believes in a public interest orientation 
to patent rights with the view that patients must come before 
profits.66 
Increasing drug costs have outstripped Thailands ability to 
truly provide universal access to all necessary drugs. As 
recognized by the World Bank and the WHO, Thailand needs to 
use TRIPS flexibilities as HIV patients develop tolerance to 
cheaper first-line ARVs. AIDS will become a death sentence, 
rather than a long-term disease for patients who cannot obtain 
second-line treatment. However, until Thailands bold action, 
many patients were denied these essential drugs because they 
are generally patented and priced beyond reach. For example, 
Abbott set the annual price of Kaletra, a good second-line drug, 
at $2,200 per Thai patient, where the average annual wage in 
Thailand is only $1,600 per year.67 In addition, heart disease and 
cancer are major sources of death in Thailand and no less serious 
than AIDS.68 Without compulsory licenses on cancer drugs, 
patients and their families will suffer either severe economic 
hardship, including bankruptcy, or certain death.69 
Thailand carefully considered the implications of granting 
compulsory licenses before doing so. In fact, Thailand attempted 
to negotiate with each patent owner to reduce prices for years 
prior to the actual licenses, but to no avail.70 While Thailand 
                                                          
 65. EXTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 45, at 35; REVENGA ET AL., supra note 45, at 4; 
Letter from Tom Allen et al., Members of Congress, to Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep. 
(Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/congressional-
schwabletter-thailand-10jan06.pdf (Thailands HIV/AIDS treatment initiative has been 
recognized as among the most successful in the developing world.). 
 66. Mongkol Na Songkhla, Preface to WHITE PAPER, supra note 43 (The Thai 
Ministry of Public Health firmly believes in a moderate and public interest oriented 
approach to implement the intellectual property right. We are convinced and committed 
to the view that Public Health interest and the life of the people must come before 
commercial interest.). 
 67. Cawthorne et al., supra note 50, at 37374; see also Open Letter, 
Christopher Fournier, Intl President, Médecins Sans Frontières, MSFs Response to 
Wall Street Journal Editorial on Compulsory Licenses in Thailand (Mar. 12, 2007), 
available at http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1957&cat=open-
letters (noting that second-line ARV medications cost at best 5 times the price of current 
first-line treatments and, in countries like Thailand, as much as 22 times!). 
 68. BRIEF REPORT OF THE OUTPUT FROM THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP FOR PRICE 
NEGOTIATION OF THE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS, reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 
43, at 71, 71. 
 69. DOCETAXEL LICENSE, supra note 58, at 22; TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER 
DRUGS, supra note 43, at 2. 
 70. WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 5; see also Robert Weissman, Op-Ed., 
Compulsory Licenses Are the Right Medicine, NATION (Bangkok), Feb. 23, 2008, 
(3) HO  1/2/2010  6:53:49 PM 
2009] COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES 1067 
could have continued to attempt such negotiations, past 
experience indicates that companies are much more willing to 
negotiate after a license has issued rather than before.71 Thailand 
did not even need to undertake such negotiations. After all, 
TRIPS clearly states that prior negotiations may be skipped not 
only when there is a public health crisis, but also when the 
license is for public noncommercial use, as Thailands clearly is 
because the drugs are distributed for noncommercial public use.72 
Contrary to the bluster of pharmaceutical giants, 
compulsory licenses are an essential part of national and 
international laws.73 The WTO rules allow member states to issue 
compulsory licenses to protect public health according to their 
own criteria; indeed, the Doha Public Health Declaration clearly 
affirms that each country has the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which [compulsory] licences are granted.74 No 
emergency is required, nor is compulsory licensing limited solely 
to ARV drugs. To the contrary, the Declaration, which was 
unanimously adopted by all WTO member states in 2001, 
provides that members agree that the TRIPS Agreement does 
not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health.75 Accordingly, it is puzzling that legal 
licenses have been improperly characterized as theft and 
breaking of patents.76 
Thailand is opening up a new market for pharmaceutical 
companies rather than compromising existing markets. In 
particular, the compulsory licenses simply enable more Thai 
citizens to have access to essential drugs; those who can afford 
                                                          
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/02/23/opinion/opinion_30066217.php ([T]here is 
no question that the government undertook extensive negotiations before issuing the 
recent licences on cancer products.). 
 71. WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 6. 
 72. In accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, each license is issued for noncommercial use to protect public health and to 
provide wider access to medicines in the case of emergency. E.g., EFAVIRENZ LICENSE, 
supra note 50, at 39; KALETRA LICENSE, supra note 50, at 42; PLAVIX LICENSE, supra note 
50, at 45. 
 73. Cawthorne et al., supra note 50, at 374. 
 74. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(b); accord Letter from 
Margaret Chan, WHO Dir.-Gen., to Mongkol Na Songkhla, Thai Minister of Pub. Health 
(Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/blogs/ipdisputesinmedicine/2007/02/dr-
margaret-chan-to-dr-mongkoi-na.html (The decision whether to issue a compulsory 
license for a pharmaceutical product is a national one.). 
 75. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 4; see Roger Bate & Richard 
Tren, The WTO and Access to Essential Medicines: Recent Agreements, New Assignments, 
HEALTH POLY OUTLOOK, Feb. 2006, at 1, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060216_ 
19636HPO200604_g.pdf (viewing the unanimously agreed-upon Doha Declaration as a 
temporary fix for access to essential medicines until tariffs are lowered). 
 76. See, e.g., Editorial, Theft in Thailand, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2007, at A8. 
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the retail price will continue to pay that price from the patent 
owner.77 Even though the compulsory licenses provide patent 
owners with less profit than their preferred price, the patent 
owners will still receive greater net profit than without the 
compulsory licenses. 
Thailand should not be punished for being more committed 
to the health of its citizens than to the profits of multinational 
pharmaceutical companies.78 In addition, Thailands budget is not 
reduced with the compulsory licenses; such licenses simply 
increase the number of citizens who receive access, rather than 
reducing financial costs to Thailand. In fact, in some cases, more 
money will be spent.79 In addition, the Thai drug market is less 
than 0.5% of the global drug market, so the compulsory licenses 
should have an insignificant effect on the profits of 
pharmaceutical companies.80 
Thailands ability to use compulsory licenses to provide its 
citizens with access to essential drugs is internationally 
recognized. International organizations including the Clinton 
Foundation and Doctors Without Borders have supported 
Thailands actions; as President Clinton stated, No company will 
live or die because of high price premiums for AIDS drugs in 
middle-income countries, but patients may.81 Moreover, the 
                                                          
 77. WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 17 ([I]t should be reiterated that the 
Government Use of Patent does not touch on the out of pocket payment market, the 
current market of the patented drugs. The Government Use only opens new market for 
those who never have access to these drugs before.). 
 78. See, e.g., Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF Welcomes Move to 
Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thailand (Nov. 29, 2006), http://doctorswithoutborders.org/ 
press/release.cfm?id=1905&cat=press-release&ref=tag-index (quoting Dr. Wilson of 
Médecins Sans Frontières in Thailand as stating that Thailand is demonstrating that the 
lives of patients have to come before the patents of drug companies, and this policy needs 
to be expanded to essential drugs that are expensive and in short supply, such as the 
AIDS drug lopinavir/ritonavir, which currently costs over 7,000 baht a month (US$194) 
and is far too expensive for Thailand.). 
 79.  See WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 13, 15. 
 80. Id. at 17 ([T]he size of the Thai drug market is less than 0.5 per cent of the 
global drug market. It is even less for the market of patented drugs. So there should not 
be significant effect on the market and return of the research based drug companies.). 
 81. Marwaan Macan-Markar, Holding Big Pharmas Feet to the Fire, ASIA TIMES 
ONLINE, May 17, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE17Ae02.html; see 
also Letter from Peter Piot, Executive Dir., UNAIDS, to Mongkol Na Songkhla, Thai 
Minister of Pub. Health (Dec. 26, 2006), reprinted in WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 84, 
84 (commending Thailand for its strong and steadfast efforts to provide access to 
antiretroviral treatment); Letter from Martin Khor, Dir., Third World Network, to 
Mongkol Na Songkhla, Thai Minister of Pub. Health (Feb. 23, 2007), reprinted in WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 43, at 87, 88 (We share the belief that life and health are the most 
important priority, and that providing the public with medicines (especially the poor who 
cannot afford it otherwise) at affordable cost is a duty of government. We therefore 
congratulate your actions to make use of the flexibilities of TRIPS . . . .). 
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WHO has stated that it supports use of TRIPS flexibilities by 
developing countries to ensure access to affordable drugs.82 In 
addition, over twenty U.S. congressmen supported the Thai 
position in a letter asking the USTR to not exercise trade 
pressure on Thailand.83 
Thailands licenses are consistent with the practice of many 
nations. Over twenty-five countries have issued, or have 
considered issuing, compulsory licenses.84 Wealthy countries, 
including the United States and European countries, have issued 
compulsory licenses and engaged in government use of patents.85 
The United States routinely issues compulsory licenses as a 
remedy for anticompetitive actions and has threatened to issue 
compulsory licenses in a variety of situations, including to supply 
generic ciprofloxacin, and to permit government use of wireless 
mobile devices commonly referred to as BlackBerries.86 If wealthy 
countries are permitted to grant such licenses, Thailand should 
not be denied the same right. 
Thailand recognizes that its actions will subject it to political 
pressure and vilification. However, Thailand strongly believes 
that it must stand up to pressure from pharmaceutical 
companies and the United States.87 Thailand is a world leader in 
securing better treatment for its patients. 
C. PhRMAs (Patent as Uber-right) Perspective 
Thailand has overruled the international patent system by 
breaking patents on numerous medicines.88 Thailands military 
                                                          
 82. Letter from Margaret Chan, supra note 74. 
 83. Letter from Tom Allen et al., supra note 65 (urging the United States to respect 
the Thai compulsory license of efavirenz). 
 84. See generally JAMES PACKARD LOVE, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTL, RECENT 
EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS (2007), available at 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf. 
 85. WHITE PAPER, supra note 43, at 4 (Thailand is not the first country to apply 
compulsory licensing or the Government Use of patent, developed countries including the 
USA, European countries, and other developing countries have previously attempted and 
implemented compulsory licensing and Government Use of Patents.); see also 
Raymond C. Offenheiser, Letter to the Editor, WSJ.COM, Mar. 14, 2007, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117382283064835964.html ([T]he United States has been 
a major user of compulsory licensing . . . .); Robert Weissman, U.S. Compulsory Licensing 
and Government Use 1, Paper Presented at the International Conference on Compulsory 
Licensing (Nov. 22, 2007) (on file with Houston Law Review) (The United States is 
probably the single greatest user of compulsory licensing in the world.). 
 86. LOVE, supra note 84, at 3. 
 87. See Macan-Markar, supra note 81 (quoting Jiraporn Limpananont, associate 
professor in pharmaceutical science at Chulalongkorn University, as stating that [w]e 
have to stand up to the pressure from the pharmaceutical companies and the US). 
 88. See Nirmal Ghosh, Thailand Breaks Patents for Heart and AIDS Drugs, STRAITS 
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government is trampling the global patent system and 
expropriating intellectual property as its own, rather than paying 
its proper share.89 
Thailand is threatening a well-established global system for 
innovation.90 Everyone knows that without intellectual property 
there is no innovation,91 yet Thailand has decided not to support 
innovation by breaking the patents.92 Although strong patents 
benefit everyone, public debates improperly pit ignorant passion 
against profit.93 Such activists blindly believe that the pipeline of 
drugs will continue even if there is less fundingseemingly 
oblivious to the fact that each new drug costs about a billion 
dollars to develop.94 
In addition to being very shortsighted, Thailands actions 
are selfish and will ironically compromise the health of everyone, 
including its own citizens.95 The costs of research and 
development must be borne by someone. If Thailand is not 
willing to contribute its share, then the rest of the world, 
including countries at even lower stages of development, will be 
required to shoulder the burden unnecessarily and in 
contravention of a prior global accord to increase access to the 
poorest countries. Higher prices for everyone besides Thailand 
are simply unfair. As a middle-income country, Thailand should 
be respecting patents to promote innovation and investment 
opportunities. It is shocking that a country ranked 34 out of 181 
                                                          
TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp? 
View,6405, (beginning news story with the assertion that Thailand has overruled the 
international patents system); Darren Schuettler, Angered U.S. Firm Excludes Thailand 
from New Drugs, REUTERS, Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
companyNewsAndPR/idUSBKK26805820070314 (quoting an Abbott spokesman stating 
that Thailand has chosen to break patents on numerous medicines, ignoring the patent 
system). 
 89. Cass, supra note 4 (characterizing Thailands actions as trampling patents); 
see Editorial, supra note 76; Adelman, supra note 32, at 34; Letter from Kenneth L. 
Adelman, Exec. Dir., USA for Innovation, to Members of Congress (May 9, 2007), available 
at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-May/011154.html (characterizing 
licenses as attacks on American intellectual property). 
 90. See Cass, supra note 4 (referring to licenses as a threat to the worlds system of 
protections for innovation). 
 91. A Gathering Storm, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2007, at 71 (quoting Fred Hassan of 
Schering-Plough). 
 92. Zamiska, supra note 53 (quoting Jennifer Smoter, spokeswoman for Abbott). 
 93. See Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Drug Patent Piracy, WALL ST. J. ASIA, May 7, 2007, 
at 15 (stating that IP protection benefits everyone and that [u]nfortunately, public 
debates on IP rights are skewed to pit passion against profit). 
 94. Id. (asserting that activists opposed to IP rights blindly assert that the drug 
companies wont stop inventing just because they will make less money). 
 95. Zamiska, supra note 53 (quoting Teera Chakajnarodom, president of Thailands 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturing Association). 
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countries based on GDP would expect any public sympathy for 
stealing patentsespecially when it knowingly diverted funds 
from health care to defense spending.96 Moreover, Thailands 
reckless action will negatively boomerang against any further 
economic growth.97 Why would any company be willing to invest 
in Thailand after it has shown such reckless disregard of 
property rights? 
Compulsory licenses are antithetical to patent rights and 
accordingly are granted rarely and under only very narrow 
circumstances. Compulsory licenses are rarely employed by any 
country, even if permitted under global rules.98 Such extreme 
action is only permitted in extraordinary circumstances, such as 
when a critical patent is not being used to produce essential 
goods or when the patent owner cannot provide adequate 
quantities of a drug in the event of a health emergency.99 
However, such situations are very rare.100 Moreover, such licenses 
should be very limited because they inevitably provide a patent 
owner with far less than a reasonable economic return.101 
Accordingly, global rules require that compulsory licenses be 
used only as a last resort.102 
Sympathizers to Thailands position are simply opposed to 
protection of all property rights.103 Thailands action is not 
                                                          
 96. Cass, supra note 93. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Editorial, supra note 4 ([N]o serious government has contemplated using 
compulsory licensing, even if its allowed to do so under WTO rules.). 
 99. Cass, supra note 4. 
 100. Activists like to emphasize that provisions for compulsory licensing commonly 
appear in U.S. statutes, but these characterizations are improper because such statutes 
regulate a variety of activities that have nothing to do with the licensing of patented 
drugs. See, e.g., Posting of Sidney Rosenzwieg, Bogus Reliance on the Clean Air Acts 
Compulsory Patent Licensing, to Progress & Freedom Foundation (Mar. 17, 2009, 14:20 
EST), http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/03/jamie_loves_bogus_reliance_on_the_clean_air_ 
acts_c.html (observing that the Clean Air Acts compulsory licensing provision for air 
pollution control technology has never been invoked in its forty-year history). Moreover, 
licenses issued as part of a remedy for actual anticompetitive conduct are similarly 
irrelevant to the health care context. Finally, a denial of a permanent injunction is not a 
compulsory license; while activists may try to equate the two as having comparable effect, 
everyone knows that a compulsory license is something issued not by a court, but by a 
government according to statute. E.g., Adelman, supra note 32, at 3. 
 101. Cass, supra note 93 ([C]ompulsory licenseslike any one-sided deal that 
doesnt require consent from the person whose property is takenalmost always leave the 
rights holder with far less than a reasonable economic return.). 
 102. E.g., A Gathering Storm, supra note 91 (noting that Jon Pender of British 
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline insisted that a compulsory license was only to be 
used as a last resort); Editorial, Drugs in Thailand, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at 14 
(WTO rules say compulsory licenses should be a last resort.). 
 103. See Cass, supra note 4 (stating that those who endorse compulsory licenses 
oppose protection of property rights in general and IP rights in particular). 
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surprising because authoritarian governments and social 
activists take what is not theirs.104 Such sympathizers are just 
the usual crowd of anti-patent hooligans that fails to understand 
that without patents, there would be no drugs for anyone. These 
anti-patent activists have tried hard to alter the meaning of 
TRIPS and were behind the 2001 Declaration that permits 
governments to deal with health emergencies posed by epidemics 
of HIV in sub-Saharan Africa.105 However, that Declaration does 
not support the compulsory license of any drug patent for any 
reason, especially when a relatively developed country with no 
epidemic, such as Thailand, simply wants to save costs by 
stealing the property of another.106 
Thailands purported interest in fostering public health is 
suspect. After all, Thailands recent compulsory licenses were 
issued after a military-imposed government suspiciously raised 
the defense budget by over $30 billion in recent years.107 Any 
purported budget crisis should be viewed with skepticism 
considering that the military-imposed Thai government gave 
itself a huge pay increase, together with a substantial increase in 
defense spending, while at the same time reducing the health 
care budget.108 Why should pharmaceutical investment worldwide 
suffer just because Thailand has elected to fund its defense 
budget, rather than legitimately pay for drugs it uses? In 
addition, why should Thailands medical budget be underwritten 
by all other countries? 
Thailands extraordinary bad faith in issuing the compulsory 
licenses is evident at multiple junctures. First of all, Thailand did 
not undertake any serious negotiations with patent owners. 
Although Thailand repeatedly invokes TRIPS, it seems to gloss 
over the fact that TRIPS requires patent owners to be consulted 
                                                          
 104. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Thai Patent Turmoil, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 
13, 2007, at 13 (referring to the free lunch crowd). 
 105. See Cass, supra note 4 (While the system of IP protections has worked well to 
encourage investment in innovations, some groups oppose protection of property rights in 
general and IP rights in particular. Over the past decade, these groups have worked hard 
to alter the meaning of the TRIPS agreement and to encourage any government that will 
listen to use compulsory licensing to break IP protections.). 
 106. Id. (characterizing the Doha Declaration as a small victory for groups opposed 
to protection of all property rights). 
 107. Roger Bate, Thailands Creaking Health System, AMERICAN, June 9, 2008, 
available at http://www.american.com/archive/2008/april-04-08/thailand2019s-creaking-
health-system; Don Pathan, Military Spending to Soar a Further 24%, NATION 
(Bangkok), June 28, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/06/28/politics/politics_ 
30037960.php. 
 108. Bate, supra note 107 (asserting that health spending in Thailand is now 3% of 
GDPdown from 3.5% a few years agoand that if Thailand simply spent an additional 
1% of GDP, it would have more than $2 billion to spend on health care). 
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prior to the imposition of a compulsory license.109 To the contrary, 
patent owners were shocked to have their patents broken without 
an attempt to first negotiate a reasonable price.110 
Thailands asserted health commitment is a sham. Thailand 
only promulgated a universal access to health program as a 
populist measure.111 Moreover, the licenses are issued to the 
Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO), which is not 
only historically corrupt, but also a state-owned monopoly for 
profit.112 In addition, any drugs made by Thailands GPO will be 
inferior to the actual patented product because the GPO facilities 
have never met WHO standards.113 Poor products may lead to 
drug resistance, or may be ineffective, which would only further 
exacerbate costs. Any purported HIV resistance in Thailand is 
likely due to its reliance on inferior drugs manufactured by its 
own GPO.114 
The alleged need for HIV treatment in Thailand is similarly 
a sham. There is no HIV epidemic in Thailand. Thailand has 
relatively low rates of HIV infection, with less than 1% of the 
population infecteda far cry from countries such as sub-
Saharan Africa where 20% of the population may be afflicted.115 If 
Thailand has truly contained its HIV numbers, there is no need 
                                                          
 109. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b). 
 110. E.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Letter to the Editor, WSJ.COM, Mar. 14, 2007, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117382283064835964.html (quoting Dr. Harvey Bale, 
Director General of IFPMA, as stating that Thailand had no serious contacts with 
patent owners prior to the imposition of the license); Schuettler, supra note 88. 
 111. See Head, supra note 1 (The nationwide health scheme was first introduced in 
2001 by then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who had a gift for coming up with 
populist policies that would keep getting him elected.). 
 112. See Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (The only winner will be 
Thailands historically corrupt Government Pharmaceutical Organization, or GPO, the 
state-owned pharmaceutical monopoly.); Editorial, Patently Wrong, WALL ST. J. ASIA, 
Feb. 9, 2007, at 12 (stating the licenses are a boon for the GPO). 
 113. E.g., Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (reporting that GPO drugs 
are at best approximate copies and that even with lax WHO standards, 18 different 
WHO approved HIV treatments have been withdrawn in 2005 due to lack of proof that 
the drugs actually worked); Editorial, supra note 76. 
 114. Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (Drugs that are not pre-qualified 
[WHO approved] may not directly kill people, but they could foster resistance to AIDS 
drugs. (quoting Lembit Rago, WHO coordinator of drug quality & safety)). Bate states 
that a 2005 study by Thailands Mahidol University found that GPO-vir, an HIV 
treatment produced by GPO, had between 39.6% and 58% resistance, which is perhaps 
the worst case of HIV drug resistance in the world. Id. 
 115. Christopher C. Horner, Thailand Stealing out of WTO?, WASH. TIMES, May 17, 
2007, at A15; Editorial, supra note 76; see also Cass, supra note 104 (Thailand today has 
a relatively low rate of HIV/AIDS compared to much of the developing world, has enjoyed 
notable success in reducing the rate of new infections (cutting the annual increase to 
about 13% of its level a decade before), and has seen a dramatic decrease in its AIDS 
death rate since 2000.). 
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for compulsory licenses of drugs. Moreover, to the extent that 
HIV is a problem, it is one that is fostered by Thailands own 
lucrative sex trade.116 
The argument that there could be any emergency that 
justifies breaking the patent on Plavix is completely laughable 
and also highlights Thailands extremely inappropriate action. 
There is clearly no threat of an epidemic based on heart disease 
because it is not an infectious or contagious disease.117 Moreover, 
to the extent that Thai citizens suffer from heart disease, the 
problem they suffer from is simply that they are wealthy 
enough to buy and consume large quantities of unhealthy foods.118 
Citizens with such wealth should be able to pay the fair price for 
medication. Alternatively, they should take better care of their 
health. Breaking a patent is completely unjustified in the case of 
a condition like heart disease that reflects an unhealthy choice of 
lifestyle undertaken by affluent citizens. 
In addition, patents are not the problem; poor health 
systems are a much bigger problem than the prices of drugs. 
Besides, drugs are already provided free or at low cost to 
countries around the world when they are truly needed. 
However, Thailands economy is in no way comparable to the 
countries that receive such low-cost drugs, such as sub-Saharan 
Africa.119 Thailand is cutting the wrong corners; instead of 
breaking patents, it should address corruption in the health 
services industry and provide better health training.120 
Thailands actions are not only suspicious, but also 
inconsistent with TRIPS. TRIPS only permits such licenses in 
limited circumstances, such as a national health emergency, and 
even then only after legitimate and lengthy efforts have been 
                                                          
 116. See, e.g., Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, supra note 43, at 2 (noting 
that Thailands AIDS epidemic is fueled by its notorious sex industry). 
 117. See Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (opining that its hard for 
anyone to argue that heart disease meets the criteria of a health emergency); Roger 
Bate, Op-Ed., Thailands Patent Attack, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 13, 2007, at 9, available at 
http://www.nysun.com/opinion/thailands-patent-attack/48499 (asserting that heart 
disease and leukemia are not epidemics). 
 118. See Ghosh, supra note 88 (asserting that heart disease afflicts the affluent). 
 119. See CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (comparing each 
countrys GDP). 
 120. See Bate, supra note 107 (alleging that other problems beyond drug costs are a 
problem, including poorly paid medical workers and corruption in the health care 
industry that are exacerbated by limited government funding); Bate, Thai-ing Pharma 
Down, supra note 43 ([T]he real risk to the poorest of the ill, and HIV sufferers in 
particular, is not drug prices but bad health systems and poor training of medical 
professionals.). 
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made to negotiate with the patent owner.121 There is no specific 
provision in TRIPS that permits Thailand to issue licenses on 
drugs that treat conditions that are not epidemics. Thailand has 
clearly violated the spirit, if not the letter, of TRIPS by taking 
such extreme action in exploiting the vaguely worded TRIPS 
agreement to simply balance its budget.122 There is no mention in 
TRIPS that licenses can be used to get more drugs than a nation 
can legitimately pay for. After all, everyone knows that the goal 
of TRIPS was to ensure that patents were given increased, rather 
than reduced, protection.123 Otherwise, innovation will fail and 
there will be no drugs to supply to the Thai market or any 
market in the world. 
The inappropriateness of Thailands action is broadly 
recognized in the international community. As stated by 
Switzerland, patents are part of the solution to long term access 
to innovative medicines in Thailand, such that compulsory 
licenses must be used only in emergencies and other exceptional 
cases or else the entire patent system will be undermined, and 
with it, the incentive to invest in research and development of 
new and more effective medicines.124 Similarly, the EU 
Commissioner of Trade has repeatedly written to Thailand to 
clarify that compulsory licenses are inappropriate to use as a 
standard business practice because that will inevitably be 
detrimental to the development of new medicines and to insist 
that Thailand stop such inappropriate use.125 Even the Director-
General of the WHO has recognized that patent protection is 
critical and that compulsory licenses must be pursued 
cautiously.126 
Thailands repeated stealing of drugs must be condemned. 
Abbotts decision to withdraw new drugs from the Thai market is 
very reasonable because Thailand has indicated that it will take 
others property if given the opportunity.127 It is completely 
                                                          
 121. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b). 
 122. Editorial, supra note 76; Lonely Thailand, WALL ST. J. ASIA, May 23, 2007, at 
11. 
 123. TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 78. 
 124. Aide Mémoire, supra note 52. 
 125. Letter from Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commr, to Krirkkrai Jirapaet, Thai 
Minister of Commerce (Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://www.vittorioagnoletto.it/ 
uploads/file/Mandelson4.pdf. 
 126. Editorial, supra note 76 (quoting WHOs Director-General as stating, Id like to 
underline that we have to find a right balance for compulsory licensing . . . . We cant be 
naive about this. There is no perfect solution for accessing drugs in both quality and 
quantity.). 
 127. See Zamiska, supra note 53 (Pharmaceutical executives say the Thai 
governments decision, which they say effectively steals the drugs from the companies 
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inappropriate for a middle-income country to steal from 
companies. 
Thailands actions also destroy a fragile global framework. 
Companies currently provide a tiered pricing system. They 
already provide drugs at higher costs to wealthy countries so that 
they can provide drugs at low or no cost in poorer markets.128 
However, this is only sustainable if it can provide some profits in 
middle-income countries that can afford to pay. If other middle-
income countries follow Thailands bad example, the entire 
structure of subsidizing drugs to poor countries will collapse. Not 
only will this result in less access to drugs for poor countries, 
but it will also reduce incentives for all drug development, 
including drugs that address the needs of developing 
countries.129 
IV. IMPACT OF PERSPECTIVES ON 
COMPULSORY LICENSING CONTROVERSY 
Although the prior Part provided a holistic flavor of how 
perspectives color Thailands licenses, this Part endeavors to 
provide a deeper description of how perspectives have influenced 
the dialogue. In particular, this Part focuses on how perspectives 
have played a key role concerning discussion of whether 
Thailands actions are proper under TRIPS. 
What may not be evident from the vignettes is the 
tremendous emphasis on different issues by the privilege versus 
uber-right perspective. The privilege perspective generally begins 
all discussions with an emphasis on the legality of Thailands 
actions under TRIPS. The uber-right, on the other hand, often 
gives short shift to even discussing TRIPS and instead argues 
that the stealing of patent rights will doom innovation to the 
detriment of all. The privilege perspective predictably interprets 
any ambiguity in TRIPS provisions in favor of justifying 
Thailands actions. However, the uber-rights de-emphasis of the 
rule of law is somewhat surprisingexcept as a reflection on the 
importance of entrenched perspectives. The importance of such a 
perspective may account for the fact that many editorials 
promoting an uber-right perspective do not even discuss TRIPS, 
                                                          
that own them, has left the industry with little choice.). 
 128. Roger Bate & Kathryn Boateng, Drug Pricing and Its Discontents: At Home and 
Abroad, HEALTH POLY OUTLOOK, Aug. 2007, at 12, http://www.aei.org/outlook/26622. 
 129. See, e.g., Bate, Thai-ing Pharma Down, supra note 43 (If other countries follow 
Thailands lead and demand no-profit African pricing, then the incentives for further drug 
development are weakened, especially for diseases uniquely affecting the Asian region, 
such as dengue fever and leishmaniasis.). 
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or, alternatively, refer to TRIPS vaguely as a legal technicality 
that does not merit any discussion.130 
This Part will demonstrate how the competing perspectives 
have introduced confusion into clear text and raised red herrings 
that detract from issues in need of actual attention. While some 
would simply accuse patent-owning pharmaceutical companies of 
obfuscation, this Part suggests an alternative explanation that is 
consistent with the perspective theory. The first section shows 
how the strength of the uber-right perspective has produced 
interpretations of TRIPS that seem to defy its clear text. The 
second section highlights non-issues that have been raised that 
mask legitimate TRIPS issues in need of interpretation. 
A. Legal Framework:  TRIPS Article 31 
TRIPS generally requires all member countries to provide 
patents to inventions that are new, useful, and nonobvious.131 In 
addition, countries must generally provide patent owners with 
the right to exclude others from their inventions.132 However, 
TRIPS also provides exceptions to the usual patent rights.133 The 
relevant TRIPS exception that permits compulsory licensing is 
Article 31,134 which states: 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use [than that 
permissible under TRIPS Article 30] of the subject matter 
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, 
including use by the government or third parties authorized 
by the government, the following provisions shall be 
respected: 
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its 
individual merits; 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, 
the proposed user has made efforts to obtain 
                                                          
 130. E.g., Benjamin Krohmal, Knowledge Ecology Intl, Notes from March 16th 2007 
U.S. Capitol Briefing on Thailands Compulsory Licenses (Mar. 16, 2007), 
http://keionline.org/print/book/export/html/426 (referring to a statement by PhRMAs 
Richard Kjeldgaard that his speech would not focus on the legal technicalities of 
compulsory licensing). 
 131. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.1. 
 132. Id. art. 28.1. 
 133. Id. arts. 3031. 
 134. Although this provision does not use the term compulsory licenses, it is widely 
acknowledged to govern the proper use of compulsory licenses. See, e.g., CORREA, supra 
note 39, at 313 (suggesting that Article 31 covers compulsory licenses even without 
express use of that term); GERVAIS, supra note 23, at 390 ([Article 31] deals with what 
are traditionally referred to as compulsory or non-voluntary licences.); UNCTAD-ICTSD, 
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 460 (2005) (using the term compulsory 
licenses in the heading of the chapter focused on Article 31). 
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authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts 
have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time. This requirement may be waived by a Member in 
the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public 
non-commercial use. In situations of national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, 
the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon 
as reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-
commercial use, where the government or contractor, 
without making a patent search, knows or has 
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or 
will be used by or for the government, the right holder 
shall be informed promptly; 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to 
the purpose for which it was authorized . . . ; 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part 
of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use; 
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use; 
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to 
adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the 
persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the 
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are 
unlikely to recur. The competent authority shall have 
the authority to review, upon motivated request, the 
continued existence of these circumstances; 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in 
the circumstances of each case, taking into account the 
economic value of the authorization; 
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the 
authorization of such use shall be subject to judicial 
review or other independent review by a distinct higher 
authority in that Member; 
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in 
respect of such use shall be subject to judicial review or 
other independent review by a distinct higher authority 
in that Member; 
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set 
forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is 
permitted to remedy a practice determined after 
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judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive. . . .135 
While a complete analysis of this provision is beyond the 
scope of this Article, some highlights will be summarized here as 
a backdrop to analyzing the competing perspectives.136 Article 31 
permits, but does not require, member states to issue compulsory 
licenses; however, if they do so, they must follow a number of 
procedural requirements. There is no limitation to use of 
compulsory licenses by poor countries; Article 31 applies 
whenever the laws of any WTO country provides for compulsory 
licenses.137 Although many assume that TRIPS limits the subject 
matter available for compulsory licensing, that is not the case. 
Rather, TRIPS focuses on ensuring that proper procedures take 
place, such as considering the individual merits of each 
compulsory license, rather than providing blanket licenses of 
entire categories of subject matter.138 Similarly, TRIPS requires 
providing adequate remuneration to the patent owner for use of 
the patent, and generally requires prior negotiation with the 
patent owner before issuing a compulsory license, although there 
are three situations where prior negotiation may be waived: a 
national emergency, a situation of extreme urgency, or public 
noncommercial use.139 In addition, although an early draft 
suggested that compulsory licenses should be generally 
minimized,140 the final text contains no such limitation. The only 
restriction to the scope of compulsory licenses is on the level of 
individual patentsthe scope and duration of individual licenses 
are to be limited to the authorized purpose.141 
Subsequent to TRIPS, all WTO members at the Doha 
Ministerial Conference agreed to a Declaration on Public Health 
                                                          
 135. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. 
 136. For a more complete analysis of Article 31, including whether Thailands 
licenses comply with Article 31, see Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: 
Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 
371, 387411 (2009). 
 137. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. There are other provisions of TRIPS that apply 
only to developing countries. See, e.g., id. art. 65 (providing transitional provisions for a 
developing country). The absence of the qualifier developing country in Article 31 thus 
suggests that there was no intent to limit this provision to such countries. 
 138. Compare TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(a) (requiring licenses be considered on 
individual merits), with Patent Act, 1923 S.C., ch. 23, art. 24 (Can.) (allowing the 
Commissioner to grant compulsory licenses for any invention by a public servant that 
relates to the nature of his employment). 
 139. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b), (h). 
 140. For example, a 1990 draft suggested that parties shall minimise the grant of 
compulsory licences in order not to impede adequate protection of patent rights. Draft of 
July 23, 1990, W/76, reprinted in GERVAIS, supra note 23, at 387. 
 141. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(c). 
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that provides further clarification on Article 31.142 The 
Declaration is not an amendment to TRIPS. However, that does 
not mean that it is not relevant. To the contrary, the relevant 
rules for interpreting international laws give primary weight to 
the ordinary meaning of the text of a treaty in its appropriate 
context, which includes subsequent agreements between all 
parties to the treaty.143 Most scholars who have analyzed this 
issue have concluded that the Declaration is in fact a subsequent 
agreement.144 Patent owners, on the other hand, tend to discount 
the Declaration as merely a political statement of no 
consequence.145 The Declaration will be discussed here as a 
relevant interpretative device. 
However, even if the Declaration were not utilized, the 
interpretation of TRIPS Article 31 should be the same because 
the Declaration simply makes explicit principles already set forth 
under TRIPS. For example, the Declaration plainly states that 
[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and 
the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences 
                                                          
 142. Compare Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(a)(c), with 
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b). 
 143. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, Mar. 21, 1986, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.); id. art. 31.3(a) (noting that the context should include any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions). 
 144. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 45 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/ 
medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf; Denis Borges Barbosa, Margaret 
Chon & Andrés Moncayo von Hase, Slouching Towards Development in International 
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 13132; Steve Charnovitz, The Legal 
Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J. INTL ECON. L. 207, 211 (2002); Susy Frankel, WTO 
Application of the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law to 
Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INTL L. 365, 40001 (2006); Carmen Otero García-
Castrillón, An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, 5 J. INTL ECON. L. 212, 212 (2002); James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 31416 (2002). 
 145. See, e.g., U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. TRADE POLICY GUIDANCE ON 
WTO DECLARATION ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES MAY NEED CLARIFICATION 34 (2007); Press 
Release, PhRMA, WTO Doha Declaration Reaffirms Value of Intellectual Property 
Protection (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.aegis.com/NEWS/PR/2001/ 
PR011126.html. However, not everyone sympathetic to patent rights has dismissed the 
Declaration. For example, Professor Alan Sykes noted that while ministerial 
declarations under the WTO are not legally binding for dispute resolution purposes, the 
Doha Public Health Declaration is primarily interpretative of imprecise obligations in 
TRIPS, and does not appear to contradict any textual provision. As such, it is likely to 
be persuasive authority . . . in the event of a dispute. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, 
Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha Solution, 3 CHI. J. INTL L. 47, 
54 (2002). 
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are granted.146 However, there is nothing in Article 31 that 
would contradict this statement because Article 31 simply 
provides provisions that should be respected by countries 
granting compulsory licenses, without requiring the approval of 
any other country or entity. Although Article 31 permits 
compulsory licenses to be challenged, the challenge occurs within 
the country granting the license.147 In addition, the Doha 
Declaration further states that [e]ach Member has the right to 
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.148 Again, this statement is consistent with Article 31, 
although it does provide additional clarification; in particular, 
TRIPS states that a national emergency or circumstances of 
extreme urgency are possible grounds for waiving the usual 
requirement to first negotiate with the patent owner, but TRIPS 
does not define when such terms occur.149 Under general 
principles of interpretation, undefined terms in TRIPS permit 
member states to self-define. What the Doha Declaration adds is 
a broader consensus of examples of particular diseases that 
should fit this definition.150 However, the general principle that 
member nations have the right to define the undefined key terms 
of national emergency and extreme urgency is inherent in 
TRIPS. 
B. Distorted TRIPS Interpretations Fostered by an Uber-right 
Perspective 
This section highlights the most extreme impact of patent 
perspectives to a proper understanding of TRIPS. It is important 
                                                          
 146. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(b). 
 147. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(i). 
 148. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(c). 
 149. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b). 
 150. However, there remains debate as to whether these are the only diseases 
permissible for compulsory licenses. In particular, the United States has contended that 
these are the only possible emergencies, while developing countries have argued for a 
broader interpretation. See, e.g., MARY MORAN, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, RENEGING ON 
DOHA (2003), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/msf052003.pdf; Chakravarthi 
Raghavan, TRIPS Consultations on Implementing Doha Recessed, THIRD WORLD 
NETWORK, Nov. 29, 2002, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5246a.htm; Brook K. Baker, 
Doha ReduxU.S. Enters New Phase of Bad Faith Bargaining (July 2, 2003), 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/hgap07022003.html; Deadlock over Scope of Diseases 
Threatens to Kill Solution (Nov. 27, 2002), http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ 
ngos11272002.html. 
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to first recall that the prior section noted that TRIPS provides no 
limits to what patents may be licensed, as well as no restrictions 
to countries that can use compulsory licenses. Moreover, the 
Doha Public Health Declaration has reinforced these rules. 
Nonetheless, these rules have been repeatedly contradicted and 
distorted by patent owners and others holding an uber-right 
view. This section is not intended to demonize those perspectives. 
Rather, the goal is to show the power of perspectives in convincing 
adherents to adopt positions inconsistent with clear text. 
1. Mythical Emergency Limitation. There are two 
variations propagated by the uber-right perspective concerning 
the extent to which an emergency is relevant to a compulsory 
license. First, there are statements suggesting that a compulsory 
license is only appropriate if a national emergency or health 
crisis exists. This is false because TRIPS only mentions national 
emergencies as relevant when issuing a compulsory license 
without prior negotiation.151 As noted above, TRIPS does not 
restrict what subject matter may be licensed, and the Doha 
Public Health Declaration affirms that each member state has 
the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences 
are granted.152 Second, some acknowledge that a national 
emergency is not always required, but still misstate TRIPS rules 
by omitting public noncommercial use as a ground for issuing a 
compulsory license without prior negotiation. Examples of each of 
these are shown below. 
a. Clear Misstatements that an Emergency Is Always 
Required. Those holding an uber-right view have repeatedly 
suggested that compulsory licenses must be limited to a narrow 
class of cases. For example, Roger Bate, a fellow of the 
conservative think tank American Enterprise International 
(AEI), stated that compulsory licenses are permissible if efforts 
to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions have failed, or in cases of 
national emergency.153 Along similar lines, Tim Wilson, Director 
of the conservative think tank Institute of Public Affairs, stated 
that Section 31(b) of the TRIPS agreement allows for 
compulsory licensing of patented technologies in cases of national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases 
                                                          
 151. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b). 
 152. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(b). 
 153. Roger Bate, Thailands Drug Wars, AMERICAN, Mar. 12, 2008, 
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/march-02-08/thailand2019s-drug-wars (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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of public non-commercial use.154 By failing to state that these 
conditions are only relevant when prior negotiation with the 
patent owner is waived and omitting all other criteria, the reader 
is left with the impression that these are the actual grounds for 
issuing a license. 
The perceived requirement of an emergency extends 
beyond patent owners to all that maintain an uber-right 
perspective. For example, a U.S. report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers states that [t]he United States acknowledges 
Thailands ability to issue compulsory licenses to address public 
health emergencies, which may sound permissive, but actually 
suggests that an emergency is required for a compulsory 
licensein conflict with the Doha Declarations clear statement 
that member states get to decide the appropriate grounds.155 
Similarly, a letter from several senators to U.S. Trade 
Representative Schwab states: 
We strongly support WTO rules that recognize the rights of 
countries to consider actions, including compulsory 
licensing, to address urgent public health needs, such as 
those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other pandemics. But we do not believe that WTO members 
intended those rules to be used to allow compulsory licenses 
on any medicine whatsoever . . . .156 
However, nothing in TRIPS states that compulsory licensing is 
limited to urgent health needs. As pointed out by a different 
group of congressmen, TRIPS does not limit compulsory licenses 
to emergencies, and instead grants each nation the ability to 
assess when licenses should be granted.157 Perhaps even the 
congressmen with an uber-right approach to patents realize that 
their view does not comport with the actual interpretation of 
TRIPS, such that they specifically emphasized their belief of 
what WTO members intended, instead of noting that proper 
interpretation of international law requires that the text 
primarily controls. 
                                                          
 154. TIM WILSON, INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNDERMINING MITIGATION TECHNOLOGY 4 
(2008), available at http://www.ipa.org.au/library/publication/1219192134_document_ 
wilson_mitigationtechnology.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 155. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE 
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: THAILAND (2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2008/NTE/asset_upload_file823_14611.pdf. 
 156. Letter from Joseph I. Lieberman et al., Members of Congress, to Susan Schwab, 
U.S. Trade Rep. (Mar. 20, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://www.keionline.org/ 
misc-docs/liebermanplus4.pdf. 
 157. Letter from Henry A. Waxman et al., Members of Congress, to Susan Schwab, U.S. 
Trade Rep. (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_ 
to_US_Trade_Representative_Susan_Schwab_Urging_Focus_on_Access_to_Medicines.pdf. 
(3) HO 1/2/2010  6:53:49 PM 
1084 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [46:4 
Another example of the force of an uber-right perspective 
lies in the writings Juliano Froehner, an assistant professor at 
the University of São Paulo Brazil, who states that although 
negotiators did authorize signatory nations to decide what 
constitutes a public health emergency that would warrant a 
CL[,] . . . it was and is understood that compulsory licenses are 
intended to be used rarely and in response to genuine 
emergencies.158 He argues that compulsory licenses should be 
limited to cases of public health crises, including those relating 
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, which 
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency.159 While the quoted material accurately 
reflects a statement in the Doha Public Health Declaration, the 
entirety of the statement fails to capture the broader message 
that those examples are merely illustrative of what constitutes 
an emergency if prior negotiation with the patent owner is 
waived. The more important statement under Dohathat 
nations have the right to determine the grounds of compulsory 
licensesis importantly omitted. 
b. Mistake by OmissionAn Emergency Is Not the Only 
Time When Prior Negotiation with the Patent Owner May Be 
Waived. A less distorted, but nonetheless incomplete, 
characterization of TRIPS is the belief that the only condition 
authorizing a country to issue a compulsory license without prior 
negotiation is that there is a national emergencyor perhaps a 
case of extreme urgency. This is in clear contradiction to the 
actual text of TRIPS, which permits waiver of prior negotiation 
in the case of extreme urgency or public noncommercial use.160 
                                                          
 158. Froehner, supra note 43, at 5. Whether Professor Froehner continues to hold 
these views is an open question because the quoted material has since been removed from 
its earlier location on the web. 
 159. See, e.g., Froehner, supra note 43, at 2 (quoting Doha Public Health Declaration, 
supra note 11, ¶ 5(c)) (CLs are permitted by the World Trade Organization in exceptional 
circumstances . . . . According to the WTO, circumstances in which they are appropriate 
include public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics, which represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency. (quoting Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(c))). 
Similarly, the Doha Declaration has been selectively quoted to give the impression that 
these are the only situations where licenses are permissible. For example, the uber-rights 
perspective will quote from the Doha Declaration that countries have the right to 
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 154, at 5. However, what is omitted from the 
discussion is that the prior sentence of the same document explicitly states that [e]ach 
Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licences are granted. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra 
note 11, ¶ 5(b) (emphasis added). 
 160. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b). 
(3) HO  1/2/2010  6:53:49 PM 
2009] COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES 1085 
However, the misconception is repeatedly emphasized by those 
with an uber-right perspective not only in the mainstream 
media161although they could potentially be simply parroting the 
vocal uber-rightbut in academic presses as well.162 For example, 
the Economist quotes Jon Pender of GlaxoSmithKline as saying 
that although compulsory licensing is legal, TRIPS rules allow it 
only under limited circumstances, such as national health 
emergencies, and only after lengthy efforts to negotiate prices 
with firms.163 Although the article clearly notes the source and 
that GlaxoSmithKline is a British drugs giant, thus suggesting 
some self-interest, there is nothing in the article to contradict 
this position as possibly inaccurate.164 
Another article acknowledges that Article 31(b) is about 
prior negotiation, yet still provides an incorrect reading. In 
particular, the article provides a block quote of Article 31(b), 
which clearly states that prior negotiation may be waived by a 
Member in the case of national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.165 
However, in the very next sentence, it is stated that a compulsory 
license without initial negotiation is permissible only in 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency.166 This concluding sentence manages to ignore 
the very text it cites in excluding noncommercial uses as a 
permissible basis to waive the usual requirement of prior 
                                                          
 161. See, e.g., PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. ASSN, PARTNERING FOR BETTER HEALTH: 
AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 26 (2007), available at http://www.qplushost.com/portfolio/ 
prema/upload/publications/PReMAWhitePaper_Thai_English.pdf (suggesting by omission 
that the Doha Public Health Declaration only affirms the right to use flexibilities for 
health crises and emergencies); Bate, supra note 153 (neglecting to mention public 
noncommercial use as a possible grounds for issuing a license without prior negotiations); 
Bate & Boateng, supra note 128, at 4; Editorial, supra note 60; Nicholas Zamiska, Thai 
Move to Trim Drug Costs Highlights Growing Patent Rift, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at 
A8 (World Trade Organization rules allow a government to unilaterally declare an 
emergency and make or sell patented drugs without the permission of the drug 
companies.). 
 162. E.g., MAY & SELL, supra note 5, at 171 (noting an exception for a national 
emergency only); Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory Licensing in 
Canada and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the WTO Rules, 
37 J.L. MED & ETHICS 222 (2009) (omitting any discussion of noncommercial use); Sykes, 
supra note 145, at 56. 
 163. A Gathering Storm, supra note 91. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Christopher E. Chalsen & Lawrence T. Welch, Growing Hostility Toward 
Intellectual Property? 8, Paper Presented at 1st IPO-JIPA Asian Practice International 
Congress (Sept. 14, 2005) (quoting Article 31(b) of TRIPS) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=14899. 
 166. Id. (emphasis added). 
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negotiation. This omission may reflect the uber-right view that 
compulsory licenses should be granted only in emergencies, 
regardless of the actual law. 
Similarly, Stanford Law Professor Alan Sykes stated that 
Article 31 limits compulsory licensing without prior negotiation 
to genuinely extreme circumstances, but mentions only a 
national emergency.167 He seems to entirely overlook the 
possibility that a country could issue a compulsory license 
without prior negotiation in a situation beyond a national 
emergency, and instead tries to characterize what would likely be 
a public noncommercial use as a twisted situation of national 
emergency. However, he is not alone. A recent article co-
authored by a professor of economics asserts that countries do 
have the option to waive the negotiation with the patent holder 
in cases of extreme urgency or national emergency, without 
any mention of the possibility of waiver in the case of public 
noncommercial use.168 In fact, the article later suggests that 
Thailand acted improperly because it simply announced the 
public use of the patent without discussing the matter with 
Merck & Co. first.169 
Interestingly, Professor Sykes seems to have concern about 
waiver of prior negotiation even in his limited circumstances. In 
particular, he is skeptical that a developing country should be 
able to unilaterally determine that they are unable to afford 
pharmaceuticals at current prices, declare that a national 
emergency results, and then implement policies that leave 
patent holders with rents near zero.170 This statement may 
reflect an uber-right view of patents that leads him to assume a 
contorted interpretation of what constitutes a national 
emergency and overlook that TRIPS plainly permits public 
noncommercial use without prior negotiation. Alternatively, 
perhaps the idea that any patent could be licensed for public 
noncommercial use is so terrifying that framing the issue as a 
clearly improper emergency seems more appropriateeven if 
this happens at an unconscious level. Similarly, an article co-
authored by Professor Lybecker suggests that while it may be 
reasonable to utilize compulsory licensing for national 
emergencies . . . . there is a need to distinguish legitimate 
compulsory licensing regimes from abusive ones.171 Although 
                                                          
 167. Sykes, supra note 145, at 56. 
 168. Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 224. 
 169. Id. at 228. 
 170. Sykes, supra note 145, at 56. 
 171. Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 225 (emphasis added). 
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abusive compulsory licenses are not defined, there is a 
suggestion that compulsory licenses can only be supported to 
address a humanitarian crisis, further suggesting that there 
should be some urgent or emergency situation to justify a 
compulsory license.172 
2. Mythical Exclusion of Some Countries. Although 
discussion of the perceived lack of emergency in Thailand seems 
to overshadow most other topics, there are a couple of other areas 
where the influence of the uber-right perspective seems to result 
in new requirements not within the literal text of TRIPS. Two 
examples exist with respect to which countries may qualify to use 
compulsory licensing. As noted above, TRIPS permits any 
member state to issue a compulsory license. Nonetheless, there 
have been suggestions that licenses be denied to middle-income 
countries, or militarily governed countries. For example, an 
article in an academic publication recently asserted that 
compulsory licensing is intended . . . for developing countries.173 
There is no citation to TRIPS for this assertionnor can there be 
because TRIPS is not so limited.174 
Critics repeatedly suggest that Thailand should not have 
been permitted to issue compulsory licenses because it is a 
middle-income country.175 However, nowhere in TRIPS Article 31 
is there a limitation on compulsory licenses based on the 
economic status of the country. Many of the criticisms are also 
tied to the general premise that middle-income countries can 
afford to pay full price. This factual premise may be disputed, 
considering at least 25% of the Thai population lives on less than 
$2 per day.176 More importantly, there is nothing in TRIPS that 
requires a country to demonstrate financial incapacity, or to be 
below a certain income level before being able to utilize 
compulsory licenses. Any suggestion otherwise may reflect an 
uber-right perspective that reads in additional limitations to 
justify the position that exceptions such as compulsory licenses 
must be limited. 
                                                          
 172. Id. (emphasis added). The article further asserts that humanitarian crises are 
more supportable than the industrial policy objective of a country. Id. However, what 
would constitute an illegitimate policy objective is not stated. 
 173. Id. at 223. 
 174. Id. at 223 & n.5 (implying that TRIPS intended for compulsory licensing to be 
used in developing countries but failing to cite any section of TRIPS for support). 
 175. E.g., Cass, supra note 4; Kazmin & Jack, supra note 45. 
 176. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, at 238 
(2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf. 
(3) HO 1/2/2010  6:53:49 PM 
1088 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [46:4 
Another issue that is sometimes raised with respect to 
Thailand is that the licenses were imposed by a military-installed 
government, as if this were a relevant factor. However, just as 
with the economic status of a country, the type of government is 
not a relevant issue under TRIPS with respect to issuing a 
compulsory license. There is nothing under the terms of TRIPS 
Article 31 referring to the type of government entitled to use a 
compulsory license, let alone any suggestion that use of licenses 
by a military-based government should be subject to increased 
scrutiny.177 
C. Non-issues Raised Versus Real Issues in Need of Resolution 
This section focuses yet again on the impact of patent 
perspectives on compulsory licenses, but from a different angle. 
Whereas the prior section provided examples of the power of 
perspectives in distorting clear language of TRIPS, this section 
highlights a more subtle, yet nonetheless significant impact of 
perspectives. In particular, this section focuses on the fact that 
perspectives may result in the propagation of non-issues under 
TRIPS that mask fundamental questions about TRIPS terms 
that are in actual need of interpretation. The competing 
perspectives are posited as responsible for the misplaced 
discussion because each perspective may yield differing, yet valid 
interpretations. This section attempts to pair the non-issues 
raised with the real issues under TRIPS jurisprudence that in 
fact need attention. 
1. No Emergency Versus Public Noncommercial Use: Is 
There an Emergency or an Epidemic? Critics have spent a great 
deal of time addressing the issue of whether there is an 
appropriate epidemic that would justify any of Thailands 
licenses.178 Some have criticized Thailands licenses as improper 
for lack of any public emergency regarding AIDS, let alone heart 
disease or cancer.179 Moreover, the comments seem to suggest 
that what constitutes an emergency should be qualified in 
contrast to the plain language of the Doha Public Health 
                                                          
 177. In fact, other provisions of Article 31 suggest that discretion is given to the 
national authority without regard to how it is organized. For example, the decision of 
what constitutes permissible subject matter is one that is within the province of the 
national government. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. 
 178. See, e.g., Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 233; Cass, supra note 4 (stating 
that Thailand is a relatively developed nation facing no epidemic). 
 179. See, e.g. Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 233 (disputing claim of adequate 
emergency where only 300,000 patients are inflicted with heart disease and only 15,000 
with lung and liver cancer). 
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Declaration, which states that each nation is entitled to decide 
what constitutes a national emergency, including HIV.180 
A great deal of the comments criticizing Thailands lack of 
an emergency would seem relevant to an uber-right view that 
wants to limit exceptions. In particular, perhaps an uber-right 
view is willing to permit compulsory licenses in the case of an 
emergency, but not for public noncommercial use, such that all 
the arguments are framed within the emergency context. 
Moreover, the attempt to further limit what counts as an 
emergency when the Doha Public Health Declaration reserves 
this issue for the national authorities also suggests the imprint of 
the uber-right view that exceptions be very limited. 
The relevant TRIPS issue that may be masked by the 
discussion of whether there is an adequate emergency is what 
constitutes public noncommercial use. As noted above, this is 
one of several grounds upon which a nation may issue a 
compulsory license without prior negotiation with the patent 
owner. Thailand has assumed that it clearly qualifies. Although a 
few critics have suggested that only a cynical distortion of TRIPS 
would possibly encompass Thailands actions, there has been 
relatively little discussion of this term. However, all of Thailands 
licenses were issued on this ground.181 
It may be more appealing to paint Thailands actions as 
failing to meet the requirement of an emergencyeven if this is 
not an issuerather than address the more difficult question of 
what constitutes public noncommercial use.182 However, some of 
the comments that attempt to fit criticism concerning the license 
of Plavix as an inappropriate emergency could be easily replaced 
by criticism against an overbroad interpretation of public 
noncommercial use. For example, the Plavix license has been 
sharply criticized as the first step on a slippery slope towards 
licensing any and all patents if heart disease were considered an 
emergency.183 However, it would seem equally apropos for the 
pharmaceutical industry to say that if public noncommercial use 
                                                          
 180. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 5(c) (emphasis added). 
 181. EFAVIRENZ LICENSE, supra note 50, at 3839; KALETRA LICENSE, supra note 50, 
at 4142; PLAVIX LICENSE, supra note 50, at 4445. 
 182. This is a challenging question under TRIPS because what uses are considered 
noncommercial, as well as for the benefit of the public, have been thorny questions in 
national laws with respect to what should be a legitimate research exception in patent 
law, as well as a legitimate fair use in copyright law. Even if a TRIPS interpretation 
focused more on dictionary definitions, rather than the vagaries of these terms under 
national law, there is likely still much room for discussion concerning what constitutes a 
public noncommercial use. 
 183. Cass, supra note 104. 
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were a permissible ground for compulsory license, it would be a 
slippery slope towards licensing any and all patents. Perhaps the 
public noncommercial use is the true slippery slope that terrifies 
patent owners such that they have displaced their concerns on 
the emergency criteria instead. 
There are a few critical articles that address the question of 
what constitutes public noncommercial use, but they generally 
take a very dismissive and conclusive approach. For example, 
some state that because the licenses were issued to a government 
agency that is for-profit, the licenses presumably must be for 
profit.184 Others assert that for Thailand to assert the application 
of public noncommercial use would be simply taking advantage 
of vague language.185 However, it is unclear whether the term 
public noncommercial use is really any more vague than other 
terms that lack definition in TRIPS; after all, when other terms 
are undefined, countries have been given freedom to define these 
terms themselves. In addition, to the extent that this term 
should have a uniform meaning, these dismissive comments fail 
to foster a productive conversation about the scope of public 
noncommercial use. While the existing comments about how 
heart disease is not an adequate emergency to justify a 
compulsory license of Plavix can be easily dismissed as legally 
irrelevant, there is an outstanding issue of whether Thailand or 
any other country could broadly license any and all drug patents 
without any negotiation with the patent owner based on the 
ground of public noncommercial use. 
2. No Research/Innovation Versus Adequate 
Remuneration. There is a disproportionate amount of 
commentary suggesting that the compulsory licenses are wrong 
or improperly issued because they will negatively impact 
research, rather than discussion of whether the licenses comply 
with TRIPS requirements. Out of the many articles criticizing 
the Thai licenses, almost none mention the amount of 
remuneration, whereas most suggest that the licenses would 
negatively impede innovation.186 While innovation is relevant, 
                                                          
 184. See id. (stating that public noncommercial use comprehends uses such as 
public research programs, not monopoly provision by a for-profit government agency); 
Christopher Horner, Thailand Stealing out of WTO? WASH. TIMES, May 17, 2007, at 1 
(presuming that the GPO will use the licenses for commercial sale based on its past 
work with private companies); see also Editorial, Good Medicine for Thailand, WALL ST. 
J. ASIA, May 29, 2008, at 13 (suggesting that the GPO is in competition with the 
pharmaceutical industry, such that a license to the GPO cannot be for noncommercial 
use). 
 185. Editorial, The Thai Flu, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A14. 
 186. E.g., Aide Mémoire, supra note 52 (Switzerland is convinced that patents are 
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TRIPS does actually address this issue by mandating that the 
patent owner be provided adequate remuneration.187 This term 
is not defined under TRIPS. However, as some scholars have 
noted, if the remuneration is truly adequate, the pipeline of new 
drugs would not suffer. Moreover, in addition to the uneven 
discussion of adequate remuneration, none of the patent owners 
brought a legal challenge to the amount of remuneration 
provided by Thailand, although that avenue was available to 
them. 
The uber-right may believe that compulsory licenses are 
inherently inconsistent with the principle of adequate 
remuneration, such that it is not worth even discussing that 
term. In the few instances where remuneration is mentioned, it 
seems clear that an uber-right perspective would deem any 
amount below the usual market value to be inadequate. For 
example, one editorial states that reasonable royalties almost 
always leave the rights holder with far less than a reasonable 
economic return, thus suggesting that any compulsory license 
would be unacceptable.188 No alternative amount of remuneration 
                                                          
part of the solution to long term access to innovative medicines in Thailand.); Ashley M. 
Heher, Abbott, Thailand Face off in AIDS Drug Patent Stalemate, AEGIS NEWS, June 6, 
2007, http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2007/AP070616.html (quoting PhRMA president as 
stating that Thailands misguided focus would have long-term cost, potentially 
limiting important incentives); Kristina M. Lybecker, Op-Ed., Compulsory Drug 
Licensing Disastrous, DENVERPOST.COM, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.denverpost.com/ 
guestcommentary/ci_8616902 (suggesting that compulsory licenses will negatively impact 
innovation in the area of neglected diseases); Sally Pipes, Sanction Nations Selling 
Generic Versions of Drugs?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 13A (suggesting that 
Thailands action sets a dangerous precedent that will stifle medical innovation and 
endanger the health of millions). This is even true of articles published in academic 
journals. One of the most recent articles discussing the Thai situation repeats the 
pharmaceutical perspective that compulsory licenses harm innovation, and while 
generally critical of the Thai licenses, this article fails to discuss whether the licenses 
provide inadequate remuneration. See Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, passim. Most 
articles suggest that innovation in general will be crippled if compulsory licenses occur, 
although some also suggest that compulsory licenses will harm innovation for neglected 
diseases that predominantly impact poor countries. For example, one article generally 
sympathetic to the uber-right noted that the pharmaceutical industry argument that 
compulsory licenses reduce incentives for research of neglected diseases is weakened by 
the lack of current research, but that it was nonetheless a viable argument because any 
obstacle to research on neglected diseases should be removed to increase the likelihood of 
innovation in these areas. Id. at 232. Similarly, some have suggested that stricter 
criteria for patentability will necessarily discourage innovation into neglected diseases. 
See Roger Bate, India and the Drug Patent Wars, HEALTH POLY OUTLOOK, Feb. 2007, at 
4, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070207_200702HPOg.pdf (suggesting that if Novartis is 
denied a patent for its beta crystal version of Glivec, it will lack incentive to develop drugs 
to address diseases unique to the Indian market, such as dengue fever, for which Novartis 
is the leader in the search for a cure). 
 187. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(h). 
 188. Cass, supra note 93. 
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is proposed; rather, the only alternative discussed is simply not 
imposing a license.189 
Despite the lack of discussion of adequate remuneration thus 
far, this could be a very important issue. After all, if a 
compulsory license could be imposed with a remuneration 
amount deemed adequate to patent owners, compulsory licenses 
would theoretically lose a major objection.190 Indeed, based on 
that theory, some academics have suggested that compulsory 
licenses ensure that patent owners get appropriate value and 
that it is a mere myth that compulsory licenses should result in 
cost-savings.191 If that were the case, a compulsory license would 
be of little value to countries attempting to use TRIPS 
flexibilities to enhance access to medicine as the Doha Public 
Health Declaration suggests is possible. 
3. Factual Dispute on Prior Negotiation Versus Defining 
Prior Negotiation. Another non-issue is the seemingly factual 
question of whether Thailand negotiated with patent owners 
before issuing compulsory licenses. While this may seem to be a 
relevant factual dispute with a single correct answer, the real 
problem is that the facts seen are a function of how differing 
patent perspectives define prior negotiation, yet another 
important, but undefined, term under TRIPS. Whereas Thailand 
asserts that it is not required to negotiate with patent owners 
prior to exercising a compulsory license for public noncommercial 
use, but in fact did attempt to negotiate for years,192 critics of its 
licenses generally contend that Thailand failed to negotiate such 
that patent owners were shocked to find out about the licenses.193 
The prior negotiation controversy highlights the impact of 
patent perspectives on undefined TRIPS terms. The privilege 
                                                          
 189. See Bate & Boateng, supra note 128, at 7 (arguing that prices set by drug 
companies are required for continued research and development, such that compulsory 
licenses constitute theft); Bate, Thailand and the Drug Patent Wars, supra note 43, 
passim (suggesting that Thailands licenses were inconsistent with TRIPS because there 
was no emergency but failing to address the issue of remuneration); Cass, supra note 4 
(arguing that compulsory licenses are only permitted under extraordinary 
circumstances and suggesting that Thailand failed to comply without mentioning any 
specific violation, let alone any discussion of what amount of remuneration would be 
adequate). 
 190. There may still be fears of parallel imports, although some academics have 
suggested that the fears are disproportionate to actual evidence. E.g., Kevin Outterson, 
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription 
Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLY L. & ETHICS 193, 26162 & n.304 (2005). 
 191. E.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 
42 GA. L. REV. 131, 15556 (2007). 
 192. See TEN BURNING QUESTIONS ON CANCER DRUGS, supra note 43, at 36. 
 193. See, e.g., Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 228; Bale, supra note 110. 
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view of patents may view any negotiation as prior negotiation, 
even if conducted years before the compulsory license is granted. 
After all, there was some negotiation and it was prior to the 
license. If patents are viewed as a privilege, the extent of 
negotiation would not seem important, nor would giving notice to 
the patent owner of an imminent imposition of a compulsory 
license be important because a patent is only a privilege, and not 
a right. However, judging from the response of patent owners 
that they were shocked that the licenses were imposed with no 
negotiation at all, it seems that an uber-right view may take a 
different view of what constitutes prior negotiation. Perhaps the 
uber-right requires prior negotiation to occur immediately before 
the license is imposed and perhaps with explicit mention of an 
impending license, rather than general negotiations years in 
advance of a license. 
The importance of prior negotiation to the uber-right may 
have resulted in at least one misstatement of the TRIPS rule. 
TRIPS plainly provides an exception to prior negotiation in the 
case of an emergency, public urgency, as well as public 
noncommercial use.194 Nonetheless, Professor Froehner alleged 
that [e]ven in a legitimate emergency . . . the owner of the IP 
rights that are confiscated is entitled under WTO rules to 
consultation before the decision is made.195 While this statement 
is inaccurate as to the actual law, it may accurately reflect what 
the uber-right views as essential, such that it becomes their 
reality. 
4. Factual Dispute of Frequency of Compulsory Licenses. 
The final non-issue shows some exaggeration by both the uber-
right, as well as the privilege views.196 In particular, whereas the 
privilege perspective asserts that compulsory licenses occur 
                                                          
 194. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(b) (This requirement [of prior negotiation with the 
patent owner] may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.). 
 195. Froehner, supra note 43, at 5. 
 196. Although this is the final non-issue discussed in this article, there are other 
non-issues that could be addressed. For example, as shown in the contrasting narratives, 
the uber-right seems to second-guess whether Thailand is acting in the interest of public 
health, although this is not technically required by TRIPS. See supra text accompanying 
notes 10708 (noting the suspicions raised by Thailands having issued the compulsory 
licenses after an increase in the defense budget and a decrease in the health care budget); 
see also Lybecker & Fowler, supra note 162, at 228 (suggesting that Thailands motivation 
to protect public health is suspect). This could be another situation where the uber-right 
would prefer compulsory licenses to be limited to health crises, such that they may seize 
any opportunity to suggest that the licensor country does not have a legitimate health 
interest. 
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frequently in a variety of countries,197 the uber-right perspective 
asserts that compulsory licenses are rare.198 This seems like 
another situation where there must be only one correct answer. 
However, the differing perspectives may once again fill 
ambiguities under TRIPS. The dispute here focuses not only on 
how often compulsory licenses are issued, but on what 
constitutes a compulsory license in the first place. However, that 
is actually a red herring because TRIPS does not even use the 
term compulsory license. Rather, TRIPS refers to uses not 
authorized by the patent owner.199 This term is considered to 
encompass not only the type of compulsory license issued by 
Thailand, but also government use of patents commonly 
practiced by the United States whereby use of patented 
inventions by government contractors are subject only to 
remuneration, but never injunctions. 
In this case, although how frequently compulsory licenses 
are issued may on its face seem pertinent to whether they should 
be permitted or granted, that is a non-issue in the context of 
what is permissible under TRIPS. Granted, frequency of 
compulsory licenses may seem like a relevant policy 
consideration, but to the extent that TRIPS states the rule of law, 
that would seem the relevant metric. So, what does each side 
have to gain by focusing on this non-issue? 
One hypothesis for the posturing concerning what counts as 
compulsory licensing and how frequently it occurs is that the 
accusations are intended to mask the other issues. In particular, 
if the uber-right, for example, can show that the privilege view on 
the number of compulsory licenses granted is an exaggeration, 
they can perhaps attempt to suggest that all statements 
concerning the privilege view are suspect. On the other hand, the 
privilege view may be attempting to indirectly tackle the non-
issue of whether compulsory licenses impact innovation by 
suggesting they occur frequently. This could be an admission by 
the privilege view that policy is relevant on some level beyond 
what is permitted under TRIPS. 
                                                          
 197. Offenheiser, supra note 85 (The intellectual property safeguards that Thailand 
exploited have been invoked by many countries, not only for medicines but for many 
fields of technology. In fact, the United States has been a major user of compulsory 
licensing . . . .); see also LOVE, supra note 84 (discussing global use of compulsory licenses). 
 198. E.g., Sidney A. Rosenzweig, The False Connection Between Strong Patent Rights 
and Global Inequity: A Response to Professor Stiglitz, PROGRESS ON POINT, March 2009, at 
1, 1920, http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.8patentstiglitz.pdf; Editorial, 
supra note 4 ([N]o serious government has contemplated using compulsory licensing, 
even if its allowed to do so under WTO rules.). 
 199. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. 
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V. EXAMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF PATENT PERSPECTIVES 
This Part addresses the importance of the patent perspective 
theory. Prior Parts have mostly focused on the relatively narrow, 
albeit contentious issue of compulsory licenses of patents. This 
Part both anticipates challenges to the general theory, as well as 
considers broader implications. For example, this Part considers 
implications of the perspective theory for an enhanced narrative 
of TRIPS history, as well as a better understanding of future 
negotiations in both domestic and global arenas. 
A. Anticipating Challenges 
The competing patent perspectives theory is important both 
because it is real and because it has not been previously 
recognized. Like all new theories and observations, challenges 
are anticipated. Accordingly, this section attempts to anticipate 
and address possible challenges to the competing perspectives 
theory set forth above. 
1. Fake Phenomena? One potential objection to the 
competing views presented here may be that the two poles of 
patent perspectives articulated do not accurately represent true 
views, or at most, represent mere rhetoric. However, the 
intensity of debates concerning compulsory licenses, including 
name-calling and full page advertisements to support differing 
positions, suggests that there is in fact something real to 
discuss.200 Moreover, even if some statements are rhetoric, when 
similar positions are evidenced by news media and academics, it 
seems less likely that they are all engaged in simple posturing. 
Also, patent perspectives may be the source of rhetoric because 
rhetoric does not arise in a vacuum. 
In addition, although compulsory licenses have been used as 
a case study to showcase patent perspectives, they are not the 
only illustration of the role of perspectives in viewing patents. 
                                                          
 200. Full page advertisements criticizing Thailands actions were taken out by a 
group called USA for Innovation in the Wall Street Journal and in the Thai media. See, 
e.g., The USA for Innovation Story, http://www.2bangkok.com/07/news07apr.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2009); Press Release, USA for Innovation, USA for Innovation Announces 
Advertising Campaign in Thailand (May 10, 2007), http://www.thaipr.net/nc/ 
readnews.aspx?newsid=2FF823462E1DE002F0DBA754EE0ABCC3. In addition, there 
were competing ads that supported Thailands actions. See, e.g., Macan-Markar, supra 
note 81 (highlighting efforts by AIDS activists in support of Thailands decision); National 
AIDS Treatment Advocacy Project, US Website Attacks Thai Governments Breaking of 
AIDS/HIV Drug Patents (May 15, 2007), http://www.natap.org/2007/newsUpdates/ 
052407_05.htm (documenting specific government and international health organization 
responses). 
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Another example lies in Indias unique patent laws that limit the 
scope of patentability for compounds that are similar to existing 
compounds; in such cases, India requires that there be increased 
efficacy.201 Indias narrow approach to patentability is consistent 
with a view of patents as privilege; indeed, the explanation given 
for this provision is a desire to foster true innovation, and avoid a 
popular pharmaceutical practice of evergreening patents with 
very small, yet patentable modifications.202 It is also consistent 
with Indias recent history of denying patents on all 
pharmaceutical products in the interest of promoting access to 
drugs, until it was required to modify its laws to comply with 
TRIPS.203 However, to patent owners and those who subscribe to 
the uber-right view, Indias law can be seen as stealing from 
innovators and casting a death knell on innovation.204 
This is not to suggest that the competing perspectives 
provide the only reason for discord. There are also other 
legitimate issues that may be at play, including, but not limited 
to, the fear that compulsory licenses will lead to other problems 
for patent profits even in countries where no such licenses issue. 
This could happen, for example, because low-cost drugs made 
under compulsory license could become parallel imports in 
another country where they undercut the price of the patent 
owner. Alternatively, the price of drugs made under a compulsory 
license may result in pressure to reduce prices in other markets 
either because some nations use reference pricing based on what 
other countries pay, or because of public pressure to offer 
                                                          
 201. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d). 
 202. See, e.g., Adarsh Ramanujan & Rajarshi Sen, Pruning the Evergreen Tree: 
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act 1970, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 135, 137 (2009). 
 203. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 5 (providing that for 
inventions in the area of food, medicine, drugs, or chemical substances, only patents on 
methods or processes of manufacture could be obtained); see also Shamnad Basheer, 
Indias Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 15, 
1719, 34 (2005) (explaining the rationale for prior patent law and the ability of the 
amended laws to limit patents on incremental pharmaceutical innovations). For an 
extensive history on Indias patent law, see Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The 
Tumultuous Transformation of Indias Patent System and the Rise of Indian 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007). 
 204. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to IndiaNovartis, Patent Law, and 
Access to Medicine, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541, 541 (2007) (According to Novartis, there 
is no faster way to kill access to the latest life-saving drugs for people in India than to 
avoid offering patent protection.); Press Release, Intl Fedn of Pharm. Mfrs. & Assocs., 
Chennai Court Ruling: Indias Innovative Potential Continues to Be Stifled by Its Poor 
Patent Law (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.ifpma.org/News/NewsReleaseDetail.aspx?nID= 
7860 (noting that the clause severely restricts innovation and that India has the 
potential to be a global leader in biomedical R&D, but its current patent legislation 
condemns it to lag behind). 
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discounted prices. However, the existence of these other factors 
does not mean that perspectives do not exist. 
2. All About Property. Another possible objection to the 
competing views presented is that they simply reflect different 
views of propertynamely, that the observations are not unique 
to patent law. It is indeed possible that there are differing views 
on personal ownership of property. However, that might actually 
suggest that the competing perspectives have broader 
application. In addition, there should be some similarity between 
patents and other property in general because by law, patents 
are often considered property.205 On the other hand, patents also 
have unique characteristics that make them distinguishable from 
real and personal property. One very important issue is that 
patents can impede access to medicinesomething that real and 
personal property rights normally do not do. In addition, while 
matters of life and death may occasionally be at issue with real 
propertyfor example, if passage through real property was 
necessary in the case of an emergencythere tends to be less 
controversy than when exceptions are made to patent rights. Part 
of this may be due to the fact that patents routinely impede access 
to medicine whereas real property does not routinely stand in the 
way of health and safety. Some may suggest that patents are a 
bargain struck by societythat the limited access to patents 
during the patent term is a proper trade for encouraging more 
innovation. However, the privilege perspective would seem to 
expect additional exceptions to patent rights despite this bargain. 
Alternatively, perhaps controversy over any property, 
whether real or intellectual, is more a function of a disconnect 
between expected and actual rights. In particular, to the extent 
that compulsory licenses are not expected, patent owners may be 
rightfully surprised about their rights being taken away. 
Similarly, when the rights of private property are seemingly 
disturbed, as happened when the U.S. Supreme Court permitted 
a broad reading of what property could be taken, rights holders 
may react strongly.206 Although there may be a similar reaction in 
both cases, they can also each be alternatively characterized as a 
disagreement between rights (whether property or patent) as an 
uber-right, or as a privilege, subject to exception. 
                                                          
 205. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (declaring that patents shall have the attributes of 
personal property). 
 206. See David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the public reaction to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005)). 
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In addition, even if there are similarities between real and 
intellectual property, disputes concerning patents and 
implications of differing privileges may be more important 
because of some distinctions between patents versus real 
property. One important difference is that the legal boundaries of 
real property are generally much clearer than with patent rights. 
Unlike the clear boundaries of real property, the legal boundaries 
of patents are notoriously unclear unless and until litigated.207 
This lack of clarity might be at least partially responsible for 
patent owners craving more certainty in other areas, such as 
limiting exceptions to patent rights. 
In addition, there is no international agreement analogous to 
TRIPS that attempts to dictate how all nations respect property 
rights. Accordingly, it may be easier for nations to have different 
views of property rights when each sovereign nation may make 
its own decision. Moreover, there are important differences 
between patents versus real property in that they each raise 
distinct issues. Although rights in patents and real property are 
both granted under national law, real property typically has no 
international analogs, whereas a patent owner often has similar 
patents in a number of countries. Accordingly, the issue of 
differing perspectives on real property would not be a global issue 
because real property does not as easily cross borders. This does 
not mean that there may not be conflict concerning property 
rights within a nation. However, the conflicts within a nation 
may be less severe given that there is more likely to be a shared 
culture. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, conflicting perspectives 
on patents raise special concern because conflicts over real 
property entitlements are unlikely to be the same death knell as 
exclusion from patented drugs. 
3. Wishful Thinking. The view that compulsory licenses 
should be limited to declared national emergencies could be 
based on an assumption that TRIPS reflects what was proposed 
or desired. After all, TRIPS was the brainchild of U.S. companies 
seeking to protect their global interest in intellectual property, 
and most agree that the final language in TRIPS often reflects 
the desires of developed countries such as the United States.208 In 
                                                          
 207. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 4668 (2008). 
 208. See, e.g., Duncan Matthews, Is History Repeating Itself? The Outcome of 
Negotiations on Access to Medicines, the HIV/AIDS Pandemic and Intellectual Property 
Rights in the World Trade Organization, LAW SOC. JUSTICE & GLOBAL DEV., June 4, 2004, 
at 4, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_1/matthews (stating that the 
final version of TRIPS was perceived to closely reflect the demands of developed 
countries and their industries). 
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the context of compulsory licenses, the United States did suggest 
that licenses should be limited to these two situations.209 In 
addition, the Brussels draft on compulsory licensingthe last 
draft before the final text of TRIPS was concludeddoes not 
include public noncommercial use amongst the categories of 
situations under which prior negotiation with the patent owner 
may be waived; although there is a separate paragraph 
suggesting that public noncommercial use by the government, or 
authorized by the government, need not comply with any of the 
procedural requirements.210 And, as noted by another scholar, the 
U.S. government has continued to represent its proposed view as 
to what TRIPS states.211 In addition, while TRIPS places no 
restrictions on which countries can use compulsory licenses, 
there is a perpetual belief by the uber-right that this should be 
the case.212 That seems clear not only from criticisms of Thailand, 
but also from other discussions about solutions to providing poor 
countries with access to medicine. 
The presumption that TRIPS contains all provisions 
originally desired may be further complicated by the fact that in 
a number of international agreements a member can claim a 
breach if expected benefits are not conferred, even if those 
benefits are not expressly stated as a requirement. Under the 
GATT, which has been superseded by the WTO, a member can 
bring a nonviolation complaint when the negotiated balance of 
concessions is upset by application of a measure, even if the 
measure is not inconsistent with the literal text of the 
agreement.213 However, in the area of TRIPS, parties agreed to 
place an initial moratorium on nonviolation complaints, which 
has yet to be lifted.214 In addition, it has been stated that 
                                                          
 209. See Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the United States art. 27, 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990). 
 210. Brussels Draft of the TRIPS Agreement subsecs. (b), (o), reprinted in GERVAIS, 
supra note 23, at 38587. 
 211. See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 320 (2001). 
 212. See, e.g., Head, supra note 1 (The drug companies have always assumed that 
the [TRIPS] exception would only be used for a dire emergency, like HIV/Aids or avian 
flu. (emphasis added)). 
 213. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIII.1(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 214. TRIPS initially provided a moratorium on such disputes; the 2005 WTO 
Ministerial Convention (Hong Kong) extended the moratorium. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 
64(2) (noting a five year moratorium on nonviolation complaints); World Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 11.1, WT/MIN(01)/17 (Nov. 
20, 2001) (stating that members shall not initiate such complaints while the TRIPS 
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virtually all the experts believe that such types of claims should 
not apply to TRIPS disputes.215 
4. Genuine Confusion. An alternative explanation to patent 
perspectives may be that they simply reflect real confusion. Even 
among intellectual property scholarsincluding those familiar 
with the patent provisions of TRIPSthere is frequently an 
assumption that an emergency is required, or at least that only 
an emergency or other situation of extreme urgency could provide 
the grounds for waiving prior negotiation.216 While there may 
indeed be some legitimate confusion, that confusion could be 
stoked by those with an uber-right view propagated by the 
media.217 
Confusion regarding compulsory licenses is exacerbated by 
the fact that the requirements of compulsory licenses relevant to 
Thailand are not the ones that have been most discussed in the 
popular press, as well as in scholarly literature. Rather, what 
may be exacerbating the confusion is a complicated procedure for 
waiver of one of the usual TRIPS requirements not at issue in the 
Thai licensesthat compulsory licenses be predominantly for 
                                                          
Council continues to study the issue); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration 
of 18 December 2005, ¶ 45, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Dec. 22, 2005) (noting a continued 
moratorium on nonviolation complaints while the TRIPS Council continues to study the 
issue); see also GERVAIS, supra note 23, at 11518 (explaining nonviolation complaints). 
 215. Haochen Sun, TRIPS and Non-violation Complaints: From a Public Health 
Perspective 5 (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/ 
Sun-TRIPS.pdf. 
 216. For example, a recent article discussing the history of TRIPS characterizes 
Article 31 as requiring prior negotiation except in the event of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, without any mention of public noncommercial 
use. Matthews, supra note 208, at 5. Rather, the article states that on the face of it, 
compulsory licenses could be granted by a developing country without prior negotiation 
with the holder of rights to key pharmaceutical patents in the case of a public health crisis 
of epidemic proportions. Id. (emphasis added). 
 217. Media reports read by the public, including academics, frequently reflect an 
uber-right perspective and seem to give it credence. For example, Ron Cass has written a 
number of editorials critical of Thailands licenses in the Wall Street Journal. E.g., Cass, 
supra note 93. His editorials definitely fall within the uber-right mold, but are given a 
sense of legitimacy because he is often referred to as former Dean and Professor of Boston 
University, as well as associated with the authoritative sounding Center for the Rule of 
Law, which is in fact a conservative group. Cass, supra note 4. His viewsor at least, his 
views together with similar views in the Wall Street Journalmay be influential even 
among those would not necessarily subscribe to an uber-right view. Although I have not 
done a full-fledged empirical study, in presenting earlier iterations of this paper, I have 
been surprised by the number of legal academics who questioned whether Thailands 
actions could be proper because the Wall Street Journal repeatedly criticized its actions. 
Granted, most who asked this question did not specialize in the field of international 
patent law, but I was still surprised that legal academics would necessarily assume that a 
claim in the Wall Street Journal that those sympathetic to Thailand were necessarily 
activists would have garnered more skepticism. 
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domestic use. In 2001, member states came to the unanimous 
consensus that poor countries with inadequate manufacturing 
capacities could not realistically use compulsory licenses under 
TRIPS because even if they issued such a license, they had no 
ability to make cheap drugs because of lack of infrastructure.218 
Moreover, countries with infrastructure to make generic drugs 
could not necessarily make and ship those drugs under a 
compulsory license because TRIPS required licenses to be limited 
to predominantly domestic use.219 For several years there was a 
global discussion concerning how to address this issue until the 
WTO announced a complicated procedure to permit waiver of the 
domestic use requirement in 2003.220 This proposal stirred further 
debate, culminating in 2005 with proposed Article 31bis, which is 
essentially the identical waiver provision proposed as a formal 
amendment to TRIPS.221 This waiver provision contains a number 
of limitations that seem to have been incorporated into the uber-
right view of compulsory licenses in general, even though the 
procedure is only applicable to compulsory licenses issued to 
supply countries without adequate manufacturing capacities. For 
example, Article 31bis is stated to always apply to any least-
developed member country, perhaps giving credibility to the 
assumptions of some that all compulsory licenses should be 
limited to such countries.222 In addition, a number of countries 
agreed to only use the procedure in case of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, perhaps giving rise to 
confusion about whether an emergency is required.223 Also, the 
confusion about whether only patents for some subject matter 
                                                          
 218. See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 6. 
 219. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31(f); see also Matthews, supra note 208, at 5 
(discussing the consequences of the domestic use limitation for those countries with 
pharmaceutical industries incapable of local production). 
 220. 2003 General Council Decision, supra note 13 (detailing the requirements of 
prospective exporter and importer countries seeking a waiver of the domestic use 
limitation, and their respective obligations when acting under such a waiver). 
 221. World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council of 6 December 2005, 
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005). 
 222. Id. at 4 (defining eligible importing member). Other countries may also use the 
provision if they have inadequate manufacturing capacity to meet their needs in a given 
circumstance beyond that controlled by the patent owner. Id. at 7. 
 223. Certain members agreed to use the system as importers only, pending their 
accession to the European Union. General Council Chairpersons Statement, Excerpt from 
the Minutes of the General Council Meeting 30 August 2003 (Paragraph n°29), 
WT/GC/M/82 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/TRIPS_e/ 
gc_stat_30aug03_e.htm. Other members that would only use the system in the case of an 
emergency include Hong Kong, China, Korea, and Mexico. Id. Some other countries, such 
as the United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Japan, promised not to use the procedure 
at all. Id. 
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may be licensed could also derive from discussion of whether the 
waiver provision was limited to the conditions listed in the 
original Doha Declaration, such as HIV and malaria. The waiver 
itself does not explicitly state that it is limited to certain 
diseases, but some have nonetheless made that contention.224 
B. Next Steps 
Although this Article has focused primarily on documenting 
how perspectives can have a dramatic impact on how a single 
provision of TRIPS is viewed, the existence of perspectives has 
additional support and implications. This section aims to use the 
perspectives to provide a richer understanding through two 
avenues. First, this section provides further evidence of the 
implication of perspectives for the history of TRIPS as well as 
current conflicts. Second, this section places the perspectives 
theory posited here in the broader context of social science 
research. Finally, this section provides some thoughts about 
possible implications, as well as points for further research. 
1. Additional Illustrations of Perspectives in Action. 
a. TRIPS RevisitedPapering over Perspectives. Most 
agree that the conclusion of TRIPS was considered a major and 
surprising accomplishment given that many countries had been 
opposed to a global regime of intellectual property rights.225 
Scholars have suggested a number of theories thus far for why 
agreement was reached on TRIPS. A common view is that 
because TRIPS was a package deal, developing countries 
willingly bargained away sovereignty over patent (and other 
intellectual property) rights in exchange for broader access to 
markets.226 Others suggest that while TRIPS can be viewed as a 
contract, it is more a contract of adhesion that developing 
countries had little choice to sign.227 Still others suggest that the 
                                                          
 224. The United States, in particular, has suggested that the list of diseases stated in 
Doha is exclusive, rather than illustrative. See supra notes 14850 and accompanying 
text. 
 225. See generally WATAL, supra note 211, at 2241 (documenting the negotiating 
process of TRIPS). 
 226. See, e.g., Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. 
INTL ECON. L. 321, 362 (2004). 
 227. E.g., PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 141 (2002) 
(The inequalities of resources and expertise, not to mention US unilateralism on 
intellectual property, would make it easy for anyone wishing to do so to depict TRIPS as 
an unconscionable bargain.); Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, the Progress of 
Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POLY 315, 334 
(1996) ([T]he TRIPS Agreement accomplishes, through the potential threat of economic 
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conclusion of TRIPS was aided by its minimal framework and 
many undefined terms.228 What the perspectives focus adds is 
that the supposed consensus was based on papering over 
competing perspectives; each country could believe that its goals 
were met under TRIPS if the language was broad enough to 
reflect competing perspectives. 
The entire TRIPS framework can be seen as consistent with 
the existence of competing perspectives. Many key terms in 
TRIPS are undefined, such as what constitutes an invention, as 
well as what inventions are sufficiently new that they must be 
patentable.229 The traditional view is that the lack of definitions 
leaves countries flexibility to define these terms as they see 
fit.230 The perspectives approach supplements this view by 
explaining why TRIPS was originally seen as compatible with all 
perspectives, though now subject to conflict. For example, if the 
term invention is undefined, the uber-right may assume that 
TRIPS requires a broad scope of subject matter to count as 
invention whereas a privilege view may assume something much 
narrower. These different views can coexist until a country 
implements a law that illustrates the discord. One recent 
example would be Indias patent law requiring increased efficacy 
as a prerequisite for patenting a compound similar to a 
preexisting compound.231 While this seems reasonable under the 
privilege view, it is alternatively viewed as unprecedented and 
improper by the uber-right because it deviates from traditional 
patent norms.232 
                                                          
ostracism, what could not be accomplished through negotiations independent of the 
international economic framework.); Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: 
TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 681, 72438 (2006). 
 228. See, e.g., WATAL, supra note 211, at 7 (contending the ambiguous language of 
the TRIPS Agreement helped resolve bitter disputes between countries with competing 
interests because its terms could be interpreted flexibly depending on the partys 
circumstances). 
 229. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.1. 
 230. See, e.g., CORREA, supra note 39, at 317; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Securing 
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v India, 1 J. INTL ECON. L. 585, 597 
(1998) (US v India confirms that the developing countries are free to adopt their own 
laws and policies with respect to all the intellectual property issues that were not 
expressly harmonized in the TRIPS standards themselves.). 
 231. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, § 3(d) 
(declaring that the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance is not an invention 
within the meaning of law). 
 232. The collision of these two views resulted in Novartiss challenge to the law. 
Novartis v. Union of India, 2007 A.I.R. 24759 (Madras H.C.) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/chennai/qrydisp.asp?tfnm=11121 (arguing section 3(d) of Indias 
amended Patents Act violates Article 27 of the TRIPS agreement declaring all 
inventions patentable, by narrowing the definition of invention). Novartis persisted in 
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Competing perspectives are also reflected in ongoing debates 
about the meaning of the Doha Public Health Declaration. For 
example, the privilege view of patents sees the Declaration as 
broadly supporting a health-based approach to patents, citing 
Paragraph 4 which states that the TRIPS Agreement does not 
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health,233 as well as Paragraph 5(b) which 
provides that [e]ach member has the right to grant compulsory 
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which 
such licenses are granted.234 On the other hand, the uber-right 
view sees Paragraph 4 as merely hortatory text of no real 
meaningafter all, how can patent rights be possibly reconciled 
with members taking any measure to protect public health if 
patents exist on drugs? In addition, the uber-right view would 
point to Paragraph 3, which states that [w]e recognize that 
intellectual property protection is important for the development 
of new medicines,235 as support for narrowly limiting exceptions 
to patent rights. Moreover, the uber-right view would interpret 
all aspects of Doha from the narrow framework of diseases listed 
in Paragraph 1HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.236 The privilege view repeatedly emphasizes that this 
initial clause more broadly begins by stating, We recognize the 
gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing 
and least-developing countries, and that the listed diseases are 
only examples, as indicated by the provisions use of the word 
especially.237 In addition, the privilege view would point again to 
Paragraph 4 as reflecting a consensus that we reaffirm the right 
of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS 
                                                          
its challenge despite repeated pressure by governments and nongovernmental 
organizations to drop the case. See, e.g., Bate, supra note 186, at 3; Tove Iren S. 
Gerhardesen, Opposition Gains Support Against Novartis Patent Lawsuit in India, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Feb. 15 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p= 
535&res=1024 (detailing the global outcry against Novartiss case against the Indian 
government); Letter from Anne Ferreira et al., Members of the European Parliament, to 
Daniel Vasella, CEO, Novartis (Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/ 
health/c/india/meps02092007.html (predicting that Novartiss success in the litigation 
would compromise Indias ability to export affordable medicines to developing countries); 
Letter from Henry Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Govt Reform, to Daniel 
Vasella, CEO, Novartis (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/ 
stories/documents/20070213183300-13686.pdf (expressing concern that Novartiss 
attempt to influence domestic Indian law could have a severe impact on worldwide access 
to medicines). 
 233. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 11, ¶ 4. 
 234. Id. ¶ 5(b). 
 235. Id. ¶ 4. 
 236. Id. ¶ 1. 
 237. Id. 
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Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose [of protecting 
public health], which is given further meaning in Paragraph 5.238 
The ability of each side to find some language to support its 
position may reflect the international reality that to achieve 
consensus, language is adopted that is capable of reflecting 
multiple viewpoints. However, this simply seems to defer 
conflicts to a later date. Indeed, even on one issue that all 
countries agreed needed resolutionthe futility of compulsory 
licensing provisions for countries with inadequate manufacturing 
capacity to make their own generic drugsconflicts abound. On 
one level, this should have been a very easy situation because all 
agreed that such countries deserved lower-cost drugs, unlike the 
controversy over middle-income countries such as Thailand. 
However, there was a great deal of haggling over whether there 
should be a limit to the types of diseases, as well as applicable 
countries.239 Even after the WTO produced a solution, in the 
form of a proposed amendment to TRIPS, problems remain as the 
amendment lacks the necessary two-thirds agreement of 
members to be enacted.240 
b. Current Conflicts. Competing perspectives may also help 
explain some current conflicts and controversies in the 
international landscape. Several scenarios are outlined here that 
reflect how perspectives operate beyond the Thailand case study. 
First, there are competing perspectives concerning the 
interpretation of TRIPS in a new situationthe seizure of drugs 
for alleged infringement in a country where they are only in-
transit to a final destination. Second, the uber-right perspective 
may be existent, yet seemingly dormant in some discussions due 
to a complex web of international interactions. Third, both 
perspectives play a role in domestic and global consideration of 
patent law and policy. 
                                                          
 238. Id. ¶¶ 45. 
 239.  See supra note 150 (describing the debate over which diseases constitute public 
health emergencies for the purpose of compulsory licenses); see also Abbott & Reichman, 
supra note 13, at 93637 (noting objections to the scope of covered diseases). 
 240. Compare World Trade Organization, Members Accepting Amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2009) (providing list of 26 member states accepting agreement), with 
World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (noting 153 members). The 
original deadline for adoption of the amendment was extended from 2007 to 2009, with 
another extension likely necessary. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 18 
December 2007, WT/L/711 (Dec. 21, 2007). In addition, agreement to the amendment is 
not the only hurdle. For example, although the United States consented to the TRIPS 
amendment, it has yet to pass any domestic legislation that would enable the United 
States to export drugs under compulsory licenses for designated countries. 
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The competing perspectives are clearly evident in discussions 
surrounding recent in-transit seizures of legally made generic 
drugs. In particular, customs officials in Europe have seized a 
number of drugs241 pursuant to an EU regulation that permits 
seizure of goods that infringe a patent.242 The current debate 
centers on whether the seizures are consistent with TRIPS.243 
An uber-right view would say that TRIPS permits seizure of 
in-transit patented goods because TRIPS only provides a 
minimum level of protection and even seems to contemplate 
extending protection to this particular instance.244 This in fact is 
the position taken by the EU.245 Similarly, the EU takes the 
                                                          
 241. E.g., Sanjay Suri, Health: EU Blocking Medicines for the Poor, INTER PRESS 
SERVICE, Oct. 20, 2009, available at http://www.ipseurope.org/news/news.php?key1=2009-
10-21%2018:02:24&key2=1; Kaitlin Mara, Generic Drug Delay Called Systemic Problem 
at TRIPS Council, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, June 9, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/ 
weblog/2009/06/09/generic-drug-delay-called-%E2%80%9Csystemic%E2%80%9D-problem-
at-trips-council; Posting of thiru, NGO Views: World Health Organization (WHO) Voice on 
Issue of Medicines in Transit to Developing Countries?, to Knowledge Ecology 
International (Mar. 13, 2009, 3:51 EST), http://www.keionline.org/blogs/2009/03/13/who-
silence-goods-in-transit; see also Fight over Generic Drug Seizure Takes Centre Stage at 
TRIPS Council Meeting, INTELL. PROP. PROGRAMME, Mar. 11, 2009, http://ictsd.net/i/ 
news/bridgesweekly/42823 [hereinafter Fight over Drug Seizure] (detailing the dispute 
over the European Commissions IP enforcement provisions). 
 242. Council Regulation 1383/2003, arts. 12, 4, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7, 89 (EC) 
(authorizing customs authorities to detain goods suspected of violating an intellectual 
property right). 
 243. In particular, India and Brazil have suggested that the EU action is in violation 
of TRIPS and have signaled that they may bring a formal dispute before the WTO. E.g., 
Pallavi Aiyar, No Cure in Sight for India-EU Drug Seizure Controversy, BUS. STANDARD, 
Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/no-cure-in-sight-for-india-
eu-drug-seizure-controversy/376436; John W. Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU 
Trade Complaint, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Aug. 6, 2009, at 1; Katilin Mara, India May Be 
Nearing Dispute Settlement with EU Over Generic Drug Seizures, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, 
Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/08/28/india-may-be-nearing-dispute-
settlement-with-eu-over-generic-drug-seizures. The relevant TRIPS provision requires 
member states to adopt procedures to enable custom officials to seize counterfeit 
trademark or copyright goods, whereas patents may, but need not be, subject to similar 
enforcement. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 51. Also, TRIPS states that there shall be no 
obligation to apply such procedures to . . . goods in transit. Id. art. 51 n.13. To further 
complicate matters, rights holders initiating the border enforcement are required under 
TRIPS to show prima facie infringement under the laws of the country of importation. 
Id. art. 52. But what is the relevant countryis it the in-transit country or the country of 
final destination? This ambiguity leaves an opening to be filled by competing perspectives. 
In addition, there is an open question concerning whether the seizures violate GATT 
Article V concerning freedom of goods. E.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Worst Fears Realized: 
The Dutch Confiscation of Medicines Bound from India to Brazil, INTELL. PROP. 
PROGRAMME, Mar. 2009, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/44192.  
 244. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (Members may . . . implement in their law more 
extensive protection than is required by this Agreement . . . .); see also id. art. 51 n.13 
(noting that goods in transit need not be subject to border enforcement, but also not 
prohibiting such action). 
 245. See Posting of thiru, Intervention by the European Communities (EC) at WTO 
General Council on the Seizure of Losartan by Dutch Customs Authorities, to Knowledge 
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position that it is the law of the in-transit country, rather than 
the final intended destination that applies to whether there is 
infringement of the in-transit goods, such that it can deem goods 
temporarily in the Netherlands as infringing upon a Dutch 
patent. In addition, the uber-right view may be responsible for 
conflation of issues by the EU as well as right holders. For 
example, in a letter to an Indian generic drug manufacturer, 
patent owner Eli Lilly stated that the generic drugs are not 
genuine Eli Lilly products and . . . [a]s such, the Tablets may not 
be safe or effective.246 However, safety and efficacy are issues 
beyond the scope of patent lawthose issues are solely for a 
regulatory agency and, by definition, generic drugs are 
considered the bioequivalent of their patented counterpart. 
Another example of conflation of issues is a statement by an EU 
representative that countries actually should be grateful to 
European customs for stopping counterfeit medicines because 
doing so has most likely . . . saved lives,247 even though goods 
that infringe patents are not counterfeitthat is a term that 
refers to trademark violationsand generic drugs are not unsafe. 
The privilege perspective, on the other hand, seems to 
underlie a number of interpretations that do not seem justified 
by the actual TRIPS text. For example, some have asserted that 
in-transit goods cannot infringe if they are legally manufactured 
and permissible at the point of final destination. However, they 
do not cite a specific TRIPS provision for support.248 In addition, 
the privilege perspective is evident in statements that place 
undue emphasis on one clause in the Doha Public Health 
Declaration that says TRIPS can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of the right to protect 
                                                          
Ecology International (Feb. 5, 2009, 9:03 EST), http://www.keionline.org/blogs/2009/02/05/ 
ec-intervention-at-wto (detailing the EC intervention at the WTO General Council 
defending the Dutch seizure of medicines en route from India to Brazil). 
 246. Letter from Eli Lilly & Co. to Cipla (Dec. 9, 2008), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/eudrugs2009letter3.pdf. 
 247. Fight over Drug Seizure, supra note 241. 
 248. Intervention by Brazil, WTO General Council Meeting Feb. 34, 2008, ¶ 6, 
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/files/RemediosIntervencao-do-Brasil-Conselho Geral-
03 02 2008.doc (asserting that medicines are generic under the law of the market where 
they are commercialized based on TRIPS, although not citing any actual TRIPS 
provisions); Michael Day, Aid Agencies Condemn Drug Confiscation, 338 BRIT. MED. J. 
1002 (2009) (noting that aid agencies assert that under WTO rules, intellectual property 
rights only apply at a shipments point of origin and destination); John W. Miller & Geeta 
Anand, India to Fight EU Drug Delays in WTO Complaint, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, at 
B4; see also Intervention by Brazil, TRIPS Council Meeting June 89, 2009, available at 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/brazil-statement-trips-june-
09.pdf (asserting that the TRIPS Agreement does not allow the detention of goods in 
transit, without citing a specific TRIPS provision that directly supports this proposition). 
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public health to suggest that any action inconsistent with public 
healthsuch as seizure of in-transit drugsis improper. While 
this quote is accurate, this statement does not provide an 
affirmative rightunlike the provisions of TRIPS at issue. 
Moreover, the cited provision omits the broader context of the 
quote, which first states that members reiterat[e] our 
commitment to the TRIPS agreement. Accordingly, it would 
seem that public health considerations can only be relevant to 
the extent that they are consistent with TRIPS. 
Interestingly, not every issue involving a conflict between 
the interests of patent owners and patients prompts statements 
reflecting the uber-right. For example, when Ecuador recently 
announced that it would consider issuing compulsory licenses for 
priority medicines, drug companies not only declined to 
condemn Ecuadorunlike their response to Thailandbut 
actually seemed to embrace Ecuadors decision.249 In particular, 
patent-owning drug companies are reported to have stated that 
[w]e accept the democratic decision . . . to use this extraordinary 
legal measure . . . . No legal right of any kind can take 
precedence over the interests of public health.250 This strong 
statement seems to reflect more of a privilege view of patents, 
rather than an uber-right view. However, whether it reflects an 
actual shift in position or simply a calculated public relations 
move is an important, yet unanswered, question.251 
It is possible that patent-owning companies continue to 
maintain an uber-right view, but have simply elected to take 
actions that would promote this view, without specifically 
telegraphing its existence, in order to avoid public criticism. In 
particular, the uber-right perspective views TRIPS as providing 
inadequate protection, such that stronger agreements that better 
reflect the uber-right perspective are required. Free trade 
agreements negotiated by powerful countries such as the United 
States and the European countries often mandate such stronger 
rights and are thus aptly referred to as TRIPS-plus 
agreements. Given this scenario, there may be no need to 
criticize potential compulsory licenses if the ability to grant them 
                                                          
 249. This is surprising because both countries are lower-middle-income countries and 
the drugs Ecuador is considering licensingsecond-generation HIV drugs and cancer 
treatmentsprompted great controversy when licensed by Thailand. 
 250. Jeanneth Valdivieso, Ecuador to Make Cheap Versions of Patented Drugs, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/ 
D9BKAV5G0.htm. 
 251. Interestingly, this bold statement is reported in the press, but not on any of the 
websites of companies that participated in this announcement. 
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will be limited by such TRIPS-plus agreements.252 Even in 
TRIPS-plus agreements that do not specifically limit compulsory 
licensing, other provisions may make compulsory licenses a moot 
point because they limit the ability of a potential generic 
manufacturer to obtain regulatory approval for the proposed 
generic drug based on existing studies completed by the patent 
owner.253 In addition, the currently negotiated Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Act, more commonly known as ACTA, could 
similarly impede access to medication through yet a different 
routeby deeming goods in transit to constitute patent 
infringement, even if they do not infringe at the point of origin or 
destination. In other words, ACTA could extend the current EU 
Regulation to a broader scope of countries. The details are 
difficult to confirm because the agreement has largely been 
negotiated under a veil of secrecy.254 However, it is nonetheless 
worth mentioning as additional evidence of a continued uber-
right perspective through actions, rather than public statements. 
The differing perspectives also have relevance for 
approaches to reforming and refining patent law on both 
domestic and global levels. To the uber-right, patent rights 
should be strong and have limited exceptions. However, to the 
privilege perspective, more exceptions to patent rights seem 
necessary. This may be reflected in recent national legislation to 
broaden compulsory licenses,255 as well as proposals to limit the 
                                                          
 252. Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public 
Health, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 14991500 (2007). 
 253. These provisions are referred to as data exclusivity and provide a different 
method for drug companies to protect their drugs from competition beyond the patent 
system. Although such provisions have been criticized for their public health 
consequences, they nonetheless often appear in free trade agreements. Carlos M. Correa, 
Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade 
Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 97, 100, 12223 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006); Meir Perez Pugatch, 
Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Access, in NEGOTIATING 
HEALTH, supra, at 81, 8491. 
 254. ACTA Text Revealed to 42 Select Insiders, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 15, 2009, 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/10/15/acta-text-revealed-to-42-select-insiders. 
 255. For example, France extended compulsory licensing to cover diagnostic patents 
in 2004 in response to concerns about the high cost and restrictive licensing practices of 
patent owner Myriad Technologies. LOVE, supra note 84, at 910; Esther van Zimmerman 
& Gilles Requena, Ex-Officio Licensing in the Medical Sector: The French Model, in GENE 
PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 123, 13233 (Geertrui van Overwalle ed., 2007) 
(highlighting this cases central role in raising global awareness of the potential 
undesirable effects on research and clinical services of restrictive licensing practices in 
the field of genetic diagnostics). In addition, Belgium has adopted a new law to permit 
compulsory licenses in the interest of public health. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory 
Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 247, 250 (2009). Although neither nation has yet utilized these provisions, their 
existence nonetheless reflects a privilege view of patents. Id. 
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scope of patentability.256 Moreover, the privilege view likely 
believes that patents are not solely responsible for innovation 
and thus may endorse current movements to consider alternative 
means of promoting innovation. Rather, they are likely to note 
that patents are an incomplete solution because patents only 
promote research into the most lucrative areas, but not the areas 
that are in most need, predominantly those afflicting countries 
with little ability to pay hefty profit margins.257 For example, the 
current charge of the World Health Organization to find 
alternative means to promote innovation, such as through prizes 
and faster regulatory approval for priority conditions, would be 
consistent with the privilege view of patents.258 
2. Support from Social Science. 
a. Perspectives as Schema. The perspectives presented here 
may also be viewed as consistent with social science literature 
that documents imperfect information processing. In particular, 
such research suggests that people rely on prior schemas or 
heuristics that are essentially unconscious biases in receiving and 
understanding new information.259 A schema has been defined as a 
mental structure which contains general expectations and 
                                                          
 256. See, e.g., Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 106 
(2007) (proposing to exclude genes from patentability). 
 257. Examples of this phenomenon are that existing patent rights seem to encourage 
firms to look for block-buster drugs that garner huge profits, as well as many me-too 
drugs that treat the same condition. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
DRUG COMPANIES 7479 (2004) (proposing drug companies be made to show the FDA 
their new products work better than existing treatments, as opposed to being merely 
effective). Moreover, such proponents might also note that although patent rights have 
been expanding in scope and strength, the pipeline of new drugs has actually been 
decreasing. See, e.g., U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SCIENCE, BUSINESS, 
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 34 (2006) (detailing the ways in which intellectual property 
protections enable pharmaceutical companies to continue profiting off existing drugs by 
making negligible changes to the drugs dosage or form, or developing new uses for them). 
 258. Sixty-First World Health Assembly, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property ¶¶ 3536, WHA61.21 (May 24, 2008), 
available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf. 
 259. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of 
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1125 (2004); see 
also SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 9799 (2d ed. 1991) 
(providing an introduction to the area of social cognition); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL 
COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 1719 (1999) ([W]e take part in shaping our own 
reality; the concepts we impose on events determine the meaning we extract from them.). 
Both schemas and heuristics are mental rules of thumb that can create errors in 
judgment. KUNDA, supra, at 56. Schemas are discussed more in the area of cognitive 
science, whereas heuristics are discussed within the field of behavioral law and 
economics. See id. at 36, 10607. 
(3) HO  1/2/2010  6:53:49 PM 
2009] COMPETING PATENT PERSPECTIVES 1111 
knowledge of the world.260 Although schemas are recognized as 
essential to enable individuals to cope with the large amounts of 
information that is present in everyday life, they have also been 
identified as a possible source of bias. Indeed, one example of a 
schema is a stereotype.261 Moreover, while some may believe that 
biases such as stereotypes are only for the uneducated, cognitive 
biases and imperfect decisionmaking can occur regardless of 
education or sociocultural background.262 Not surprisingly, the 
lessons of social science have been applied to a variety of areas to 
both break obvious deadlocks as well as reveal new phenomena.263 
Each perspective can thus be seen as a schema through 
which individuals receive and understand information, such as 
TRIPS. While much of legal analysis assumes that individuals 
may be completely impartial, this is not consistent with social 
science research. However, existing frameworks for analysis, 
such as the framework for interpreting TRIPS, seem to assume 
that there can be a single and consistent meaning. Even if an 
individual could hypothetically do so, the existing research on the 
existence and power of prior schemassuch as patent 
perspectivessuggests that attempts to interpret TRIPS will be 
done through the lens of the preexisting perspective. The 
distorted TRIPS interpretations and non-issues documented here 
seem entirely consistent with the lessons of schemas. Granted, 
schemas have more often been discussed in connection with 
fundamental beliefs or stereotypes.264 However, views of patents 
seem to also fit within the same model in that there seem to be 
fundamental beliefs that are so intractable that their adherents 
go to great lengths to try to persuade others through the creation 
of websites, full-page advertisements, campaigns to Congress, 
and beyond. 
                                                          
 260. MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS & IAIN WALKER, SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED 
INTRODUCTION 32 (1995). 
 261. Chen & Hanson, supra note 259, at 112526. 
 262. Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and 
Administrative Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 589 (2002); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1997) (noting how 
people in most social categories exhibit signs of unrealistic optimism). 
 263. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 149495 
(2005) (applying implicit bias theory from social cognition literature to show how the FCC 
relaxation of ownership orders may exacerbate implicit racist biases); L. Song Richardson, 
When Human Experimentation Is Criminal, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 94 (2009) 
(suggesting that implicit biases may result in doctors being given more lenient criminal 
treatment); Stern, supra note 262, at 59091 (contending cognitive consistency theory as 
applied to notice and comment rulemaking limits public participation in federal 
rulemaking). 
 264. See, e.g., FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 259, at 9799; KUNDA, supra note 259, at 
17. 
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Another important issue with schemas or any prior opinion 
is that they may be resistant to change. Sometimes referred to in 
the area of psychology as the concept of cognitive consistency, 
there is research to show that people will maintain preexisting 
beliefs out of proportion with actual correctness, even when 
subsequent evidence reveals that the initial information was 
incorrect.265 The general theory is that people have an inherent 
need to ignore, discredit, or rationalize inconsistent information 
to avoid the discomfort of cognitive dissonance.266 Those who view 
patents as an uber-right may thus ignore TRIPS provisions if 
they do not comport with the view that patents should be uber-
rights and instead focus on innovation. Similarly, a view of 
patents as privilege could persist in the face of competing evidence 
that strong patent rights are relevant to support at least some 
types of innovation. This is consistent with research that suggests 
a tendency to minimize or trivialize inconsistencies.267 
b. Implications. Even with this brief introduction to social 
science literature, it should become apparent that perspectives 
are not easily modified. Accordingly, any proposed solution that 
aims to find a middle ground between the two competing 
perspectives may actually be doomed to fail as individuals with 
differing perspectives each reject the middle ground. This may 
initially suggest that perspectives have no bearing on future 
solutions. However, that is not necessarily the case; it may 
simply be that further investigation into the existence of 
perspectives, as well as social cognition, is necessary. For 
example, some have suggested that beliefs are a function of 
culture and that a better understanding of the underlying 
cultural worldviews may be helpful in addressing controversies.268 
                                                          
 265. See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE 169 (1980); Craig A. 
Anderson, Mark R. Lepper & Lee Ross, Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of 
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1037, 104142 (1980); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation 
Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (1996); 
Helen C. Harton & Bibb Latané, Information- and Thought-Induced Polarization: The 
Mediating Role of Involvement in Making Attitudes Extreme, 12 J. SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 271, 289 (1997); Charles G. Lord, Less Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased 
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently 
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 209899, 210506 (1979); 
Arthur G. Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure, 
Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 564 (1993). 
 266. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 23 (1957). 
 267. E.g., Linda Simon, Jeff Greenberg & Jack Brehm, Trivialization: The Forgotten 
Mode of Dissonance Reduction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 250 (1995). 
 268. See, e.g., Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the 
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Further exploration of these questions may be necessary now 
that these perspectives have been highlighted. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The principal aim of this Article was to uncover and 
document the power of competing perspectives, using the Thai 
compulsory licenses as an illustration. The implications, 
however, of such perspectives are much broader. The divergent 
views on the Thai licenses are symptomatic of many disputes 
concerning the proper balance of patents and public health, 
including, but not limited to, controversies under TRIPS. 
The competing perspectives help to explain current 
difficulties addressing disputes concerning the extent to which 
TRIPS provides nations with flexibility to address public health 
needs. In a pre-TRIPS world, a nation that believed patents on 
drugs unduly limited access to medication could restrict 
patentability or, alternatively, provide broad exceptions to patent 
rights. However, in a post-TRIPS world, although national 
discretion technically exists under TRIPS, the extent of that 
discretion is widely disputed.269 The TRIPS provision permitting 
compulsory licensing is one such example of where TRIPS clearly 
permits national discretion, yet that discretion has been 
challenged. 
The competing perspectives are also relevant to the 
currently unanswered question concerning the relevance of policy 
in the face of clear law. In particular, patent owners as well as all 
uber-right view holders repeatedly suggest that compulsory 
licenses present a huge threat to innovation that must be 
considered regardless of global rules. Those who view patents as 
privilege predictably state that the present rules reflect 
negotiated rules after a discussion of policy. Who is correct? 
If global rules can be easily jettisoned based on one sides 
argument that the rule is not proper policy, what then is the 
point of the rule of law? In addition, considering policy after rules 
have already been enacted should be done in a uniform way. If 
patent owners want to consider policy issues in discussing 
                                                          
Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 
55 EMORY L.J. 569, 57071 (2006) ([T]he only meaningful gun control debate is one that 
explicitly addresses whether and how the underlying cultural visions at stake should be 
embodied in American law.); John Gastil et al., Deliberation Across the Cultural Divide: 
Assessing the Potential for Reconciling Conflicting Cultural Orientations to Reproductive 
Technology, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1772, 1781 (2008). 
 269. See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 78, 30 (granting countries discretion to 
formulate, administer, and enforce intellectual property laws through the use of 
permissive language subject to varying interpretations, especially may and should). 
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whether compulsory licenses should be issued, nations should 
also be able to reevaluate the policy of having a patent system to 
begin with because there is no clear data that patents alone lead 
to more prosperity. Patent owning companies are unlikely to 
want to reevaluate whether nations should be permitted to 
deviate from the TRIPS requirement to have some level of 
minimum patent rights. So, why should they be permitted to 
deviate from the TRIPS rules regarding exceptions to patent 
rights? Moreover, if countries could at any time revisit previously 
negotiated rules, wouldnt that wreak havoc on the rule of law 
and make all negotiations moot? 
On the other hand, if every international accordwhether 
an official treaty or new solutionsimply papers over existing 
(albeit non-negotiated) perspectives, continued conflicts seem 
inevitable. If this is true, there is a broader lesson for all future 
attempts to legislate in the international arena. In particular, 
signing an international agreement does not necessarily indicate 
consensusat least not on critical perspectives. While this may 
be an obvious point to some in the international arena, the 
tension surrounding issues of patents and public health perhaps 
depicts an important example for future attempts to modify 
national laws through international negotiation. 
In addition, while this Article exposed the existence of 
perspectives, more work remains to be done to better understand 
and mediate these perspectives. Social science research informs 
us that even among academics, there may be implicit biases that 
work against seeing these perspectives. Accordingly, further 
examples, together with greater use of research from cognitive 
science, may be necessary. After all, that very research tells us 
that people may cling to beliefs in the face of contrary evidence. 
This Article takes a first step towards challenging beliefs, but 
further discussion and elaboration of some of the current 
controversies discussed here may help bolster the case for the 
existence of perspectives. However, additional research into the 
existence and interplay of divergent perspectives may be central 
to eventually addressing how to best mediate competing views of 
patents that have tremendous implications for any attempt to 
eventually provide a sustainable outcome that balances patents 
and public health. 
